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Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990
Lauren Robel*
Federal district courts have viewed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as
a mandate to adopt procedural rules inconsistent with existing law. But in this
article, Professor Robel argues that the Act neither compels nor authorizes
such local deviations. Citing examples from reforms underway in district
courts nationwide, Professor Robel contends that courts' assertions of broad
rulemaking authority rest on a misreading of the Act and of the compromise
between Congress and the judiciary that led to its passage. Professor Robel
cautions that the goal of national uniformity underlying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should not be compromised lightly. However, she argues that,
while probably unwise, the Civil Justice Reform Act was within Congress' con-
stitutional power to enact. She concludes by urging rulemakers to more care-
fully consider the costs and benefits of local rules.
For more than half a century, the normative vision animating federal civil
procedure has been national uniformity and regularity in procedural rules.
From the 1938 promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 through
the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act,2 Congress has remained com-
mitted to a single set of national procedural rules for federal civil litigation. 3
In 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA),4 making
the federal trial courts responsible for the reduction of costs and delay. Many
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. The
author served as the Reporter for the Civil Justice Advisory Group for the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana, whose views are not represented in this paper. Many thanks to
Michael Ausbrook, Daniel Conkle, Larry Dessum, Aviva Orenstein, Bill Popkin, Judith Resnik, Gene
Shreve, and especially Carl Tobias for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Brad Manns and
Robert Laudeman for research assistance.
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were transmitted to Congress on January 3, 1938. The
Rules provoked controversy, causing Congress to adjourn without acting on them. Under the Rules
Enabling Act (REA), Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), the Rules became effective on Septem-
ber 16, 1938. Henry P. Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System, 1922-1947, 31
F.R.D. 307, 505-12 (1963).
2. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 401-407, 102 Stat.
4642, 4650 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074). The 1988 amendments were designed to exert
greater control over local rulemaking and to open national rulemaking to public scrutiny. See text
accompanying note 136 infra.
3. While Congress has appeared committed to the ideal of uniformity, that ideal has often been
honored in the breach in practice in the federal trial districts. See text accompanying notes 132-139
infra.
4. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-106, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089-98
(1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992)).
1447
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
courts have begun to implement the legislation under the misconception that it
marks a major congressional departure from the conviction that federal civil
procedure should be uniform across the nation. These courts believe that the
CJRA launched an enormous experiment in civil procedure that promises far-
reaching and unpredictable effects on federal practice.
As courts begin to wrestle with the CJRA's requirements, the range of in-
terpretations of the legislation has become apparent. Some courts view the Act
as a grant of broad authority to adopt procedures inconsistent with the Federal
Rules and with other statutory mandates. Acting under color of the CJRA,
districts have ordered attorneys to disclose information to their opposition with-
out waiting for discovery requests, required participation in alternative dispute
resolution as a prerequisite to trial, and even-in the most extreme case-im-
posed across-the-board caps on attorney fees.5 Responses to the Act's mandate
diverge so widely that a journalist recently compared them to snowflakes.6 If
these courts have won the power they believe the CJRA granted them, the uni-
formity and simplicity that distinguish federal practice under the national pro-
cedural rules are threatened more seriously than at any time since the 1938
enactment of the Federal Rules.7
I argue that these courts are wrong. The CJRA neither compels nor autho-
rizes local deviations from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other statu-
tory law.8 While the CJRA encourages a search for local solutions to the
5. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CiviL JUSTICE REFoRM Acr RFORT. DEVELoPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS AND PILOT COURTS (1992) [herein-
after JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RaoRT] (discussing alternative dispute resolution, mandatory disclosure,
and contingent fees).
6. Don J. DeBenedictis, An Experiment in Reform, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 16, 16. DeBenedictis
further noted that "[t]he differences are great enough that a fat report on the early plans from a special
task force of the ABA Litigation Section is largely made up of charts giving side-by-side comparisons of
the courts' approaches to assorted topics." Id.
Not only the ABA finds interpreting the broad range of courts' responses awkward. A recent
Judicial Conference Report to Congress was largely reduced to descriptions and charts tracking each
district's developments. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5.
7. To review the long and difficult path towards uniformity which culminated in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015,
1042-98 (1982). Professor Burbank notes that
[bly 1896, the ABA's Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law com-
plained that all but a few specialists in federal practice felt the need to rely on the clerk of
court for guidance, and that a federal practitioner "even in his own state, f[elt] no more
certainty as to the proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country."
Id. at 1041 (quoting Report of A.B.A. Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19
A.B.A. REP. 411,420 (1896) (alteration in Burbank)). The lack of uniformity impeded the development
of interstate practice. Id. at 1042. Burbank cites "a common view of federal practice" in the pre-Rules
days: "'To the average lawyer it is Sanskrit; to the experienced federal practitioner it is monopoly; to
the author of text books on federal practice it is a golden harvest.' "Id. (quoting Report of the Commit-
tee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 46 A.B.A. REP. 461, 466 (1921)).
8. Professor Linda Mullenix concludes that the Act was intended to allow wholesale local
rulemaking in derogation of national rules. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Mullenix, Counter-Reformation]; Linda S. Mullenix,
Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 1283 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking]. While I share Professor Mul-
lenix's dismay with the CJRA, I disagree with her conclusions. See notes 167-226 infra and accompa-
nying text.
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problems of cost and delay, it is not a broad warrant to experiment with any
procedural innovations that a district deems possibly helpful in reducing cost
and delay.
Part I of this article examines the federal civil justice reform process out-
lined in the CJRA. Part II describes various measures adopted in implementing
the statute by the first thirty-four federal trial districts to do so. It focuses on
the more egregious examples of districts overreading their statutory authority to
effect procedural change most broadly.
Part III examines the nature of the authority the statute actually grants. It
offers, and rejects, the strongest textual argument for broad local rulemaking
authority through an examination of its statutory and legislative context. Part
m concludes that the CJRA was never intended to permit the range of proce-
dural innovation it has spawned. Rather, misconceptions about the scope and
intent of the legislation reflect misunderstandings about the nature of the com-
promise reached between the judiciary and the Congress which allowed the
passage of the Act. Indeed, inattention to the statute's text has contributed to
the misinterpretation of the Act.
In Part IV I evaluate and reject the recent claim that the Civil Justice Re-
form Act is constitutionally infirm as a violation of the separation of powers.
This claim takes the procedural Babel the CJRA spawned as important evi-
dence of Congress' incompetence in the area of judicial rulemaking. While
persuasive arguments exist against the wisdom of the CJRA, Congress clearly
did not exceed its power by enacting it.
Part V evaluates the impulse for local procedural innovation. Our commit-
ment to federal civil procedural uniformity has always been incomplete: Local
courts regularly operate in ways that are in tension with national norms.9
Should this impulse for localized procedure be respected, or even nurtured?
The arguments for uniformity are strong and obvious-and carried the day in
1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted. 10 The substan-
tial attraction of federal litigation is in some measure due to the simplicity and
coherence of the Federal Rules. I argue that while some of the reasons offered
for local procedure are defensible, many are not. Before we further compro-
mise our commitment to national procedure, we need to evaluate the situations
warranting local answers to procedural problems, as well as the nature and
identity of the local proceduremakers to whom we would commit these
9. Development of local court procedures under the CJRA-even if unauthorized-is not unprec-
edented. Local rules enacted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 came under scrutiny when the
Local Rules Project discovered some 800 local rules inconsistent with the Federal Rules in use in federal
courts around the country. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uni-
formity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1999, 2023 (1989). The
Standing Committee on Civil Rules considered an amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83
that would have allowed controlled experimentation with departures from the Federal Rules. See COM-
MFri-EE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PREuMI-
NARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EvIDENCE Proposed Rule 83 (1991), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 152 (1991) [herein-
after PROPosED AMENDMENTS]; see also A. Leo Levin, Local Rules As Experiments, 139 U. PA. L. Rav.
1567, 1570 (1991) (arguing in favor of experimentation).
10. Burbank, supra note 7, at 1043-98.
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decisions.11
I. THE CIvIL JUSTICE REFoRM ACr
In 1989, the Brookings Institution, at the suggestion of Senator Joseph
Biden, chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, convened a task force to study
delay and cost in federal civil litigation. 12 The task force recommended a se-
ries of case-management strategies designed to streamline the process and to
attack discovery abuse. 13 Senator Biden incorporated these case-management
recommendations into the legislation he introduced as the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990.14
As first introduced, the bill would have required courts to adopt a broad
range of detailed case-management procedures. I5 The legislation assumed both
that federal civil cases took too long and that the delay-and consequent
cost-was attributable largely to lawyer avarice and judicial neglect. This im-
plied criticism of the judiciary attracted strong opposition from federal
judges. 16 Through the Judicial Conference, judges voiced a series of concerns.
Many felt the legislation unwisely preempted the established judicial rulemak-
ing process. They further argued that the statute did not account for existing
statutory demands on the federal courts, such as the Speedy Trial Act. 17 More-
over, judges found the statute insensitive to the variety of local conditions,
ranging from crowded urban dockets to relatively uncongested courts.' 8 In re-
sponse to the judicial resistance, Senator Biden substantially restructured ele-
ments of the legislation. Most importantly, he eliminated the requirement that
each district adopt identical, statutorily detailed case-management procedures.
As adopted, the CJRA requires each federal district court to implement a
"civil justice expense and delay reduction plan" intended "to facilitate deliber-
ate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litiga-
tion management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil
disputes."'19 Each plan is to be the product of cooperation between judges and
those who use the courts. Therefore, courts must convene civil justice reform
11. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 9, at 152 (Proposed Rule 83).
12. See TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JusTIcE RFoRM, BROOKINas INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: RE-
DUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989) [hereinafter BROOKINOS REPORT]. I have previ-
ously argued that the Brookings report came up short in its evaluation of problems in the federal courts.
This inadequacy is partially due to the absence of sitting federal judges on the task force. See Lauren K.
Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. R.sOL. 115, 117-27 (1991).
13. BROOKINoS REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
14. S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). This was only the first version of the CJRA; Senator
Biden later offered an amended version, S. 2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), as Title I of the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.). Senate Bill 2648 underwent further change prior to its enactment. See notes 83-88, 114-
140 infra and accompanying text for a more complete account of the two versions' differences.
15. See, e.g., S. 2027, supra note 14, § 471(b)(2)(A) (requiring courts to adopt a case-tracking
system classifying cases on intake, and specifying the provisions of an "expanded civil cover sheet" for
future use in making track assignments).
16. See Robel, supra note 12, at 117.
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
18. See notes 118-120 infra and accompanying text.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992).
[Vol. 46:14471450
FRACTURED PROCEDURE
advisory groups composed of lawyers, litigants, and the local United States
Attorney or his or her designee.2 0 Each advisory group is charged with assess-
ing the docket in order to identify trends in the demands on court resources and
causes of excessive cost and delay.21
The Act, however, provides no guidance on how to identify and evaluate
cost and delay, nor does it tell advisory groups how to assess whether cost and
delay are actually excessive. 22 Moreover, excessive cost and delay could have
any number of sources beyond the group's reach, including lawyers' case-man-
agement habits, the court's managerial skills or values, clients' expectations,
congressional legislation,23 and decisions by the executive branch.24 Finally,
the legislation fails to suggest how to proceed in "assessing the state of the
docket."
Despite the lack of legislative guidance, the completion of the docket-as-
sessment process by some districts has supplied a wealth of information about
the federal district courts. Most districts employed statistical data collected by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.25 Many courts surveyed
or interviewed lawyers and-less successfully-litigants about their litigation
experiences. Most also interviewed or surveyed the judicial officers in the
district.26
Once its evaluation is complete, the advisory group must prepare a report
for the court, assessing the extent of excessive costs and delays, recommending
20. Id. § 478(b), (d).
21.
In developing its recommendations, the advisory group ... shall promptly complete a thor-
ough assessment of the state of the court's civil and criminal dockets. In performing the
assessment for a district court, the advisory group shall-
(A) determine the condition of the civil and criminal dockets;
(B) identify trends in case filings and in the demands being placed on the court's
resources;
(C) identify the principal causes of cost and delay in civil litigation, giving consideration
to such potential causes as court procedures and the ways in which litigants and their attorneys
approach and conduct litigation; and
(D) examine the extent to which costs and delays could be reduced by a better assess-
ment of the impact of new legislation on the courts.
Id. § 472(c)(1).
22. See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62
FoRDHAm L. REV. 833, 850, 861-80 (1994) (discussing the underlying assumptions and analytical com-
plexities of the "delay problem"); Robel, supra note 12, at 119-22 (arguing that we have few answers to
the normative question of how long a case "should" take).
23. For instance, many judges have complained that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988), dramatically increased their workload. See JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 137 (1990) (re-
porting that 90% of judges responding to a survey believed that the 1987 Sentencing Guidelines made
sentencing more time-consuming). For an interesting analysis of this problem, see Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act: Recalling the Virtues of Delegating
Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 659 (1992).
24. See Richard F. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations for Re-
form, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 461,484-506 (1990) (discussing the effect on the federal courts of an execu-
tive decision to remove thousands of people from the Social Security disability rolls).
25. The Administrative Office releases a substantial amount of statistical information each year.
See, e.g., 1992 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP.
26. See JUDICIAL CoNERENtcE REPORT, supra note 5, ex. A.
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remedial measures the court should adopt to reduce cost and delay, and sug-
gesting the court either develop a plan or select a model one.2 7 In making its
recommendations, the advisory group must consider six "principles and guide-
lines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction" and six "litigation
management and cost and delay reduction techniques." 28 These techniques,
guidelines, and principles-discussed in more detail below-need only be con-
sidered; they do not have to be adopted.
The court must then consider the report and adopt a plan.29 With the ex-
ception of a limited number of demonstration and pilot courts,30 the CJRA
leaves ultimate control over the content of the adopted plan in the hands of the
judiciary, not the advisory group.31 The CJRA directed all districts to complete
this process by the end of 1993, although many, known as early implementation
districts, chose to implement plans much more quickly.32
II. THE CJRA PLANS
There are ninety-four federal trial districts.3 3 The "bottom-up" 34 approach
to civil justice reform adopted by the CJRA thus created ninety-four groups of
practitioners, litigants, court clerks, and judges with diverse ideas on how to
improve the process of litigation.
A number of these ideas clash with the existing Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. One of the more egregious examples of local rulemaking contrary to
the Federal Rules and under the auspices of the CJRA involved discovery re-
quests. At the time the early implementation districts (EIDs) adopted their
plans, the Standing Committee on Civil Rules had recommended amending
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to require that parties disclose information
without waiting for a discovery request.3 5 While this proposal had a rocky
history, it ultimately succeeded in December 1993-a full year after the EIDs
27. 28 U.S.C. § 472(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
28. Id. § 473(a)-(b). These sections require that the district courts consider the techniques, princi-
ples, and guidelines in their evaluations.
29. Id. § 471.
30. See note 32 infra.
31. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 472 (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring that district judges implement the plans);
id. § 474(a) (stipulating that judicial circuit committees review the plans); id. § 474(b) (mandating that
the Judicial Conference review the plans).
32. Id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 103-105, 104 Stat. 5089,5090-97 (1990)
(amended 1992)). Districts completing the process by the end of 1991 are labeled "Early Implementa-
tion Districts" and received certain funding benefits. In addition, certain courts were designated "Dem-
onstration Program Districts." The Act requires these districts to adopt specific case-management
programs. For example, while the Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of Ohio must
experiment with case-tracking systems, other districts have to adopt some of the case-management tech-
niques outlined in § 473(a)-(b). Finally, the Judicial Conference must designate "Pilot Program" dis-
tricts, whose plans must remain in effect without changes for three years. Id.
33. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the civil justice expense and
delay reduction plans that were adopted in the first 34 districts to complete the CJRA process).
34. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings on
S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Senator Biden).
35. PROPosED AMENDME ms, supra note 9, at 87 (Proposed Rule 26) (requiring automatic disclo-
sure of specified core information).
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adopted their plans.36 Despite their passage, at the time twenty-one EID courts
implemented plans requiring mandatory disclosure,37 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly did not sanction these rules. Moreover, these EIDs remained
indifferent to the fact that mandatory disclosure conflicted with the existing
structure of discovery, which required that attorneys identify and request rele-
vant materials from their opponents before such information would be
supplied.38
The Eastern District of Texas offers a second example of infidelity to na-
tional rules. It set up a case-tracking scheme that assigns some cases to tracks
prohibiting discovery altogether or limiting it to mandatory disclosure items.39
It also adopted an offer of judgment rule inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68.40 Moreover, the East Texas plan states that "to the extent that
36. The new disclosure rules' ultimate fate, however, remains subject to controversy. The
Supreme Court transmitted the proposed new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 26, to
Congress on April 22, 1993, over a remarkable dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Souter and
Thomas). See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms, 113 S. Ct. 479 (1993).
For a history of the controversy, see Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited: Committee de-
bates further amendments, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 1992, at 1. The Advisory Committee first recommended
mandatory disclosure, but it backed down in the face of negative comments, only to again reverse course
and recommend the proposal in its final evaluation. Detractors argue that the exchange requirements
both imperil the attorney-client privilege and require a large effort that could prove wasteful if the case
is later settled or decided on motions. For discussions of the arguments on both sides, see Griffin B.
Bell, Hugh Q. Gottschalk & Chilton Davis Vamer, Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to
Reform, 27 GA. L. REv. 1 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 822-28 (1991); Carl Tobias, Collision
Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993).
37. JuozcLAL CotNFERErcE REPORT, supra note 5, ex. D (detailing the mandatory disclosure plans).
Most mandatory disclosure plans call for the exchange of "core case information." Generally, "core
case information" includes:
(1) The name, address, and telephone numbers of each individual likely to have informa-
tion that bears significantly on any claim or defense;
(2) A copy of, or description by category and location of, all documents and tangible
things in the possession or control of the party that are likely to bear significantly on any claim
or defense;
(3) A computation of damages; and
(4) Insurance agreements that may be used to satisfy all or part of the judgment.
Id.
Provisions vary substantially among districts. The District of Delaware, for instance, requires
mandatory disclosure in civil RICO, personal injury, medical malpractice, and employment discrimina-
tion actions. In addition, parties must provide "core information" with their pleading and identify expert
witnesses. In contrast, the Eastern District of New York requires exchange of "core information," docu-
ments relied on in drafting the pleading, and expert witness testimony. The District of Idaho requires
the exchange of expert witness information, data upon which the expert relies, exhibits to be used, and
lists of the expert's previous testimony. Id.
Thus, few districts adopted provisions parallel to the version of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26
that was ultimately adopted. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see Tobias, supra note 36, at 144 (noting that many
plans' disclosure schemes differed from the proposed Rule 26). The courts' reliance on the proposed
amendment, rather than the one passed on to the Supreme Court, caused the divergence. Tobias, supra
note 36, at 144.
38. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26.
39. U.S. Dismrxcr COURT FOR THE EASTERN DisTucr OF TEXAs, Crvri JusTICE ExPa'sE AND
DELAY REDuCnON PLAN 1 (1991) [hereinafter TExAs PLAN].
40. Id. at 10; see Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Proce-
dure, 24 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1393, 1416-18 (1992) (discussing conflicts between adopted plans and other
authority).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan, the Plan
has precedence and is controlling." 41
Third, potential conflicts arise between the plans and other statutory re-
quirements. For instance, many of the districts have implemented forms of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), while some others require litigants to par-
ticipate in ADR before continuing in federal court.42 In 1988, Congress gave
twenty district courts limited statutory authorization to experiment with
mandatory reference to arbitration.43 Courts have since wrestled with whether
they can order parties to arbitrate-or to participate in other forms of ADR-in
districts not designated by Congress for ADR use. Some of the early CJRA
plans assume that the Civil Justice Reform Act not only authorizes mandatory
referral to ADR, but also permits courts to adopt any form of ADR they choose.
The District of Montana's plan, which sends half of all civil cases filed directly
to magistrate judges without asking the litigants' prior consent as required by
28 U.S.C. § 636, offers a fourth example of possible conflicts with other federal
statutory requirements.44
Finally, certain plan provisions, such as the Eastern District of Texas' cap
on contingency fees-if it is in fact authorized by the Act-raise the possibility
that the CJRA dramatically expanded the power of local courts to effect sub-
stantive policies.45
In sum, while implementing plans under the CJRA, some districts have
adopted procedures clearly inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Plan provisions in other districts conflict with federal statutes other than
the Federal Rules. Still other provisions sweep broadly in their regulation of
attorney conduct46 and fees, raising questions about whether the CJRA dramat-
ically altered or expanded local courts' powers. All of these provisions starkly
call into question the nature of the authority conferred upon local courts by the
CJRA.
41. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 39, at 9.
42. For a description of alternative dispute resolution programs under the CJRA, see JuDIciAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, ex. C.
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988); see notes 105-111 infra and accompanying text.
44. While litigants can request an Article III judge, they must do so within a certain time limit or
waive their rights. See Tobias, supra note 40, at 1417.
45. TEXAS PLAN, supra note 39, at 7-8. Montana's Attorney Conduct Committee, created to su-
pervise litigation conduct, also raises this possibility. See Tobias, supra note 40, at 1421.
46. For example, as part of its plan,
[t]he Montana District is establishing a peer review committee, composed of federal court
practitioners "appointed by majority vote of the article III Judges of the district in active
service," which will review the litigation conduct and discovery practices of lavyers who
practice in the court. The committee will analyze litigation behavior or discovery practices at
the request of any judicial officer, who will provide it with a statement describing the ques-
tionable activity.
Tobias, supra note 40, at 1421 (quoting U.S. DisTrmcr COURT FOR THE Dismucr OF MoN-rANA, Crvm
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 17 (1991)). The committee then must deliver the judge
an advisory opinion on the validity of the litigant's questioned practices. Id. Professor Tobias notes,
however, that the Montana Plan "affords few procedural prescriptions, particularly in terms of due pro-
cess." Id.
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ITI. AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY THE CJRA
An analysis of the authority the CJRA confers upon local courts must con-
sider two questions: first, to what extent Congress expressly adopted provi-
sions conflicting with preexisting statutes or rules; and second, to what extent
Congress delegated to local courts the power to create and adopt provisions
conflicting with such statutes or rules. For the reasons explained in Part IH.B
below, I conclude that while the CJRA contains several minor provisions that
explicitly change preexisting law, Congress did not radically revise the process
of rulemaking through the CJRA. Therefore, the Act does not empower local
courts to make independent procedural decisions that conflict with national
rules or statutes. Given my conclusion with respect to the latter question, I
have resolved tensions between explicit CJRA grants of authority and preexist-
ing authority in favor of textual interpretations that harmonize the CJRA with
preexisting legislation and rules whenever possible without straining the sense
of the text.4 7
The CJRA represents a cautious approach to new trial court procedures.
For the most part, its provisions are detailed descriptions of case-management
tools already available to trial judges. In some cases, the CJRA expands those
tools in limited ways, or suggests new approaches. In other cases, it authorizes
more expansive use of ADR. Surprisingly, few of the adopted plans contain
much discussion of the Act's authorizing provision, which I examine in detail
below.
A. What Does the CJRA Authorize?
Generally, the CJRA requires districts to implement a civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan.4 8 More specifically, the Act details the provisions
that the plans "may include."4 9 The language of the Act is permissive: Only a
limited number of designated districts50 are required to include any of the listed
47. Since Congress did not explicitly state an intent to repeal any Federal Rules or statutes by
passing the CJRA, it is tempting to cite the available statutory canon that supports the reading of the text
that implies a repeal of previous statutes. But applying this canon to the CJRA is problematic. With
few exceptions-most notably the pilot and demonstration districts mentioned above-federal courts
need not adopt any of the CJRA provisions. I am convinced, however, that the Act should be read in a
manner that harmonizes with preexisting rules and statutes because Congress neither authorized local
procedural innovation conflicting with the Federal Rules, nor attempted to avoid the restrictions 28
U.S.C. § 2071 places on local rulemaking. See notes 135-139 infra and accompanying text.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act does not define "implementation."
49. Id. § 473(a)-(b).
50. The CJRA designates certain "demonstration" and "pilot" courts. For example, courts in the
Western District of Michigan and the Northern District of Ohio received mandates to demonstrate sys-
tems of differentiated case management. Moreover, the Act commissioned the Northern District of
California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and the Western District of Missouri to develop
various other methods of reducing cost and delay. See id. § 471 note (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 104-105, 104 Stat. 5089, 5097-98 (1990) (amended 1992)).
The Act further requested the Judicial Conference to designate 10 "pilot districts" required to in-
clude the § 473(a) provisions in their plans. Id. The Judicial Conference named the Southern District of
California, the District of Delaware, the Northern District of Georgia, the Southern District of New
York, the Western District of Oklahoma, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of
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"principles and guidelines"51 or "techniques. '52
The Act contains three types of specific provisions. First, a number of
case-management provisions merely duplicate or elaborate on powers already
existing under the Federal Rules. Second, other provisions encourage ADR.
Third, the Act includes a catch-all provision that allows courts to adopt "such
other features as the district court considers appropriate after considering the
recommendations of the advisory group."53
1. Provisions duplicating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The CJRA contains a number of provisions that duplicate powers granted
under existing rules. First, several of the Act's provisions encourage judicial
officers to exert early control over their cases. 54 For example, section
473(a)(2) suggests "early, ongoing control of the pretrial process through in-
volvement of a judicial officer in... assessing and planning the process of a
case." This planning can include controlling the extent and timing of discov-
ery, setting deadlines for filing motions, and setting "early, firm trial dates." 55
But the CJRA provisions for early and ongoing judicial management of
cases duplicate powers already available to federal trial judges through Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16. That Rule instructs judges to enter scheduling
orders to control the course of the litigation and provides for pretrial and sched-
uling conferences to "establish[ ] early and continuing control so that the case
will not be protracted because of lack of management." 56 Judges routinely
used this authority for scheduling orders that "limit[ ] the time to file and hear
motions," "complete discovery," and control "any other matters appropriate in
the circumstances of the case." 57  The Advisory Committee noted in 1983,
when Rule 16 was amended, that the rule "[shifts] the emphasis away from a
conference focused solely on the trial and toward a process of judicial manage-
ment that embraces the entire pretrial phase."58
Second, the CJRA provides a number of suggestions for management of the
discovery process. These suggestions include preparing discovery schedules
Tennessee, the Southern District of Texas, the District of Utah, and the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
JuDXCIaL. CoNFEREN E REPoRT, supra note 5, at 1.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
52. Id. § 473(b).
53. Id. § 473(b)(6) (explaining that this section's objective is referred to in § 472(a)).
54. See, e.g., id. § 473(a)(1) (discussing "systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that
tailors the level of individualized and case specific management to [specific criteria]"); ia
§ 473(a)(2)(B) (mandating "early and ongoing control of the pre-trial process" through improved plan-
ning and scheduling to assure "that the trial is scheduled to occur within eighteen months after the filing
of the complaint"); id. § 473(b)(1) (requiring "that counsel ... present a discovery-case management
plan ... at the initial pre-trial conference").
55. Id. § 473(a)(2). The provision requiring systematic differential treatment of cases also dupli-
cates existing authority. Id. § 473(a)(1).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2). The CJRA also includes provisions for setting deadlines and sched-
ules for motions practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(D) (Supp. IV 1992). Likewise, Rule 16 requires
the court to enter a scheduling order that "limits the time ... to file and hear motions." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(2).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3), (5).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1983 amendments).
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and holding discovery conferences in complex litigation,59 controlling the ex-
tent and timing of discovery generally,6° requiring attorneys to present discov-
ery case-management plans, 61 and "encourag[ing] cost-effective discovery
through voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their attorneys
and through the use of cooperative discovery devices."62 These recommenda-
tions again duplicate authority already available to judges through established
case law63 or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 and 26(f). Both of these
rules authorize courts to hold conferences to schedule and phase discovery, as
well as to impose sanctions for the failure to participate in good faith in framing
a discovery plan.64
Under color of the CJRA, many courts have enacted mandatory information
exchange provisions that require litigants to provide their opponents with speci-
fied types of information-even in the absence of specific discovery requests.
The sole statutory authority for these provisions rests in section 473(a)(4),
which, as noted, refers to "encouragement of cost-effective discovery" by
means of "voluntary" information exchange. Interpreting this section as grant-
ing courts the authority to require the exchange of information strains the text.
Similarly, the Act speaks of "the use of" cooperative discovery devices, not
the creation of such devices. Reading the statutory language in harmony with
then-existing procedure would have courts encourage litigants to make use of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29, which allows litigants to stipulate to modi-
fications of discovery procedures, and thereby to agree to cooperate in discov-
ery. Any reading of section 473(a)(4) as authorizing courts to adopt mandatory
disclosure rules conflicts with the statute's reliance on "voluntary exchange" of
information, as well as with its statement that such an exchange should be en-
couraged, not mandated. 65
59. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
60. Id. § 473(a)(2)(C).
61. Id. § 473(b)(1).
62. Id. § 473(a)(4).
63. See, e.g., CHARLEs ALAN Wmom & ARTHuR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACnCE AND PROCE-
DuRE § 2036 n.30 (1970) (discussing and collecting cases).
64. See FnD. R. Civ. P. 37(g). The Senate Report on the CJRA explains:
The authority provided in [28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(C)l is intended to supplement the au-
thority to limit discovery currently provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, prin-
cipally in Rule 26(b)(1). The 1983 amendments to this rule were clearly a step in the right
direction in the effort to control discovery. But the problems of excessive and abusive discov-
ery remain substantial, and additional measures are necessary.
S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1990). The following text reveals that the Senate was
unaware of the full extent of trial judges' current powers.
As a result, subsection (a)(2)(C) gives judges and magistrates the additional authority to con-
trol discovery. The tools they might use include phasing discovery into several stages and
phasing the use of interrogatories. With this clear statutory mandate, it is hoped that judges
and magistrates will no longer be unsure about the degree to which they can act to reduce
discovery expenses.
Id. Interestingly, a Second Circuit report the Senate Report both quotes and relies on specifically recom-
mends that district judges both implement phased discovery and limit the use of interrogatories, while
pointing out that both devices are authorized under the existing Rule 16. Final Report of the Committee
on the Pretrial Phase of Civil Cases, 115 F.R.D. 349,454 (1986), cited in S. REP. No. 416, supra, at 55.
65. Given the controversy over mandatory disclosure provisions described in note 36 supra, one
would expect a discussion of mandatory disclosure somewhere in the legislative history if it were, in
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Two certification requirements suggested by the CJRA exemplify the mod-
est expansions of trial court authority actually conferred by the Act. The first
requires attorneys filing discovery motions to certify that they have made a
good faith effort to resolve the conflict before filing.6 6 This statutory require-
ment explicitly goes beyond anything then mandated by the Federal Rules. 67
The second-a requirement that all requests for extensions of discovery or trial
deadlines be signed by both the attorney and the party-modestly expands the
signature requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26(g). 68
By authorizing judges to explore settlement in complex cases69 and requir-
ing parties to have attorneys with settlement authority present at conferences,70
the CJRA also duplicates existing provisions of Rule 16, which makes discus-
sion of settlement appropriate at all pretrial conferences. 71 Several courts inter-
pret Rule 16 as allowing a judge to compel a party-or someone else with
settlement authority-to appear at a pretrial conference in order to facilitate
settlement.7 2
The Act also authorizes the "systematic, differential treatment of civil cases
that tailors the level of individualized and case specific management" to factors
including "case complexity, the amount of time reasonably needed to prepare
fact, contemplated by the legislation. The legislative history does not suggest, however, that anyone
believed the Act conferred authority to implement such mandatory provisions. The Senate Report calls
§ 473(a)(4) "self-explanatory," stating blandly in explanation that "the more voluntary and cooperative
the discovery process can be made to be, the fewer costs will be incurred by all parties." S. REP. No.
416, supra note 64, at 56-57.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
67. This type of requirement has seen wide adoption as a local rule. See MODEL LOCAL R. 37.1
(Judicial Conference of the U.S. 1989). The Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project determined that
this rule was not inconsistent with the Federal Rules, reasoning that a requirement on parties to confer
before filing motions would merely supplement Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(0, which allows a
party to move for a discovery conference if "counsel ... has attempted without success to effect with
opposing counsel a reasonable program or plan for discovery," on the theory that after such efforts,
"[counsel] is entitled to the assistance of the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1980
amendments). The Advisory Committee had earlier indicated a desire to promote informal conferences
to encourage resolution of discovery disputes. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 advisory committee's note (1970
amendments).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1992). The purpose of the proposed signature rule is to
require notification of the client whenever an attorney seeks to delay discovery or trial.
69. Id. § 473(a)(3)(A).
70. Id. § 473(b)(5).
71. FED. R. Cirv. P. 16(a)(5) (listing settlement as an "objective" of pretrial conferences); FED. R.
Crv. P. 16(c)(7) (providing that the possibility of settlement may be discussed at pretrial conferences);
cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrGATION SECOND §§ 23.1-.2 (1985) (discussing the role of the court in
settlement and related special problems).
72. Dvorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608, 611 (D. Neb. 1988) (sanctioning attorneys who appeared
at a settlement conference without settlement authority from the client under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(f) as "substantially unprepared to participate"); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp. 567 (D.
Okla. 1987) (upholding a local rule requiring attendance at a settlement conference of both the lead
attorney and someone with settlement authority). In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), the court held that trial courts have "inherent authority" to
require a represented party to appear at settlement conferences. Both the House and Senate Reports
accompanying the CJRA make clear Congress' intent to specifically authorize the result reached by the
Seventh Circuit in G. Heileman Brewing. H.R. REP. No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990); S. REP.
No. 416, supra note 64, at 59. But see David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 1969, 1989-90 (finding no grant of "inherent authority" in
Rule 16).
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the case for trial, and the judicial and other resources required and available for
the preparation and disposition of the case."'73 In other words, the legislation
suggests courts should systematically differentiate among cases on the basis of
each case's need for individualized and case-specific treatment, an apparently
nonsensical instruction.
The Senate Report suggests case tracking as one way to provide such "sys-
tematic, differential treatment." 74 Both formal and informal case-tracking pro-
cedures predate the CJRA, however. For instance, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(b) allows district courts to exempt certain categories of cases
from the scheduling order requirement. 75 All district courts have used local
rules to exempt such classes of cases, usually on the theory that uncomplicated
cases would not benefit from even the minimal level of management a schedul-
ing order imposes.76 In contrast, the Manual for Complex Litigation stresses
early identification of cases likely to be complex and time-consuming, so that
they may be targeted for special management efforts.77
The task force report that the CJRA's sponsors relied upon suggested case-
tracking schemes that assigned cases to one of up to three tracks, each with
different deadlines for motions and discovery. 78 The earliest version of the
CJRA took the same approach: Upon filing, each district would have assigned
cases to "appropriate processing tracks that operate under distinct and explicit
rules, procedures and timeframes for the completion of discovery and for
trial."'79 Although in practice such schemes could clash with provisions of the
Federal Rules,80 a close reading of the early proposal reveals that even its spon-
sors did not contemplate that track provisions might conflict with existing Fed-
eral Rules.81 To avoid conflict between the Act's language and the Federal
73. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
74. The Report notes that this is not the only implementation method possible. S. REP. No. 416,
supra note 64, at 53.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (requiring scheduling orders "[e]xcept in categories of actions exempted
by the district court rule as inappropriate").
76. For example, Social Security appeals are often exempted from these requirements. Some
courts even exempt complex cases from Rule 16. See NANCY WEEKS, DisTicr COURT IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF AMIENDED FEDERAL CIVIL RULE 16: A REPORT ON NEW LOCAL RULES 8-10 (1984).
77. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION SECOND § 20.11 (1985). The Manual suggests a number
of management strategies for such cases, including agenda items for initial conferences and discovery-
control checklists. Id. § 40.1-.2.
78. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 12, at 14-16.
79. S. 2027, supra note 14, § 471(b)(1)(B). The bill also contained a mechanism for resolving
disputes over track assignments, id. § 471(b)(2)(C), and a special set of mandatory procedures for com-
plex cases. Id. § 471(b)(3)(1).
80. For instance, imagine a track that grants priority to defendants in taking depositions on the
theory that certain classes of cases will therefore be resolved more quickly. This hypothetical rule
would be inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d), which states that generally "methods
of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by
deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery." The Advisory Commit-
tee notes that while a district court may upon motion and in the interest of justice grant exceptions, "a
local court rule purporting to confer priority in certain classes of cases would be inconsistent with this
subdivision and thus void." FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1970 amendments).
81. Most tracking provisions dealt with enforcing deadlines. See, e.g., S. 2027, supra note 14,
§ 471(b)(3) (establishing a mandatory discovery conference in the first 45 days after the filing of a
responsive pleading); id. § 471(b)(6)(A) (setting presumptive time limits on discovery).
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Rules, the current statute simply requires that case-tracking schemes work
within the confines of the Rules. As the earlier legislation demonstrates, this is
easily accomplished.82
The obvious question is why Congress passed legislation duplicating the
existing Federal Rules. The answer, in part, lies in the report upon which the
original version of the Act was based.83 This document argues that the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although focused on in-
creasing judicial powers to manage cases aggressively,84 failed to change
judges' behavior.85 In its findings, the CJRA echoes the report's view, noting
that plans "should also recognize that there has not been adequate utilization of
available and existing tools to respond to this substantially changed civil litiga-
tion system, to control cost and delays."' 86 Thus the legislation was premised
on the principles and goals of the 1983 amendments and was meant to en-
courage their use by judges.87 The more directive and radical approach to case
management Congress originally preferred was precluded, as I explain below,
by the bargain struck with judges during the Act's passage. Instead, the final
legislation contains many provisions that are both precatory and redundant.88
2. Provisions for alternative dispute resolution.
Another category of CJRA provisions involves alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR). Many federal trial courts have experimented with a variety of
ADR devices, and Rule 16 includes "the possibility of... the use of extrajudi-
cial procedures to resolve the dispute" as a pretrial conference subject.89 The
82. As demonstrated in the text accompanying notes 113-152 infra, nothing in the legislative
history suggests that the change in language was intended to give localities greater freedom to deviate
from preexisting statutory requirements.
83. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 12, at 8-11. Reed Dickerson argues that legislative history-
to count as context of a statute's enactment-"must be (1) relevant; (2) reliable and reliably revealed;
(3) reasonably available to the audience (that is, shared by author and audience); (4) taken into account
(that is, relied on), as constituting part of the communication, by both author and audience." Reed
Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, 11 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1128
(1983). Dickerson found study group reports, on which legislation is subsequently based, the most
reliable form of nontextual legislative material; committee reports came in second. Id. at 1130-31. The
Brookings Report is especially reliable in this context because the task force was "convened ... at the
behest of Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to address delay and cost in
the federal trial courts." Robel, supra note 12, at 117. Furthermore, both the report's definition of the
problems of cost and delay and its suggestions of the causes underlying these problems were incorpo-
rated into Senate Bill 2027 by Senator Biden. Id. at 128.
84. See ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILrrY 20-28 (1984).
Professor Miller served as reporter for the Advisory Committee that recommended the 1983
amendments.
85. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 12, at 8-9.
86. S. 2027, supra note 14, § 2(15).
87. The task force report is stronger, agreeing with the criticism that the 1983 amendments were
too piecemeal to cause real change in judges' behavior. See BROOlINGS REPORT, supra note 12, at 8
(citing Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 MAINE L. REv. 241, 242-
51 (1984)). The political bargain struck with the judges, discussed below, precluded a more radical
approach to case management, whereas earlier versions of the legislation would simply have mandated
"fundamental changes that would dramatically improve the system." Id.
88. See notes 151-152 infra and accompanying text.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7); see Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
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CJRA explicitly gives courts "authorization to refer appropriate cases to alter-
native dispute resolution programs that... have been designated for use in a
district court; or... [that] the court may make available, including mediation,
minitrial, and summary jury trial."90 It also grants courts the power to establish
early neutral evaluation procedures. 91
While these sections clarify the trial courts' power to adopt and use alterna-
tive dispute resolution, they leave more difficult questions unanswered. First,
although the legislation authorizes courts to adopt the listed forms of ADR, it is
unclear whether courts may require parties to participate before allowing them
to proceed to trial.92 Before the CJRA, the question of courts' authority to
order mandatory reference to ADR received inconsistent answers.93 Unfortu-
nately, the CJRA's text does not explicitly resolve the question. The legislative
history provides no clear guidance either.94 Congress previously manifested
Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REv. 889 (1991); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adap-
tions to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 3, 23-34.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
91. The CJRA allows a court to include in its plan "a neutral evaluation program for the presenta-
tion of the legal and factual basis of a case to a neutral court representative selected by the court at a
nonbinding conference conducted early in the litigation." Id. § 473(b)(4). For a description of these
procedures, see Robel, supra note 89, at 23-28.
92. Several courts have adopted mandatory ADR programs through their CJRA plans. For exam-
ple, the Eastern District of Texas requires mandatory mediation in most cases, as does the Southern
District of West Virginia. JuDIc.AL CoNruEe~cs REPORT, supra note 5, ex. C at 6-7. The Southern
District of California implemented a requirement that "a non-binding mini-trial or summary jury trial
shall be ordered in all cases where the potential judgment does not exceed $250,000 and the use of this
procedure will probably resolve the case." Id. pt. I at 27. This requirement also provides "[n]on-
binding arbitrationlmediation" in "all even numbered simple contract and tort cases (excluding FTCA)
where the potential judgment does not exceed $100,000 and in every even numbered trademark and
copyright case." Id.
93. Several trial courts found authorization for mandatory orders in Rule 16 or the court's inherent
authority. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.RD. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (approving mandatory
reference to summary jury trial authorized under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(a)(5), (c)(7), (10),
(11) or inherent authority); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec., 117 F.R.D. 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (finding authority in both Rule 16 and the court's inherent power to manage its own cases), aff'd,
854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1988). One court found the authority to send a
case to mandatory court-annexed arbitration in Rule 83's authorization of local rules. Kimbrough v.
Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 574-77 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (validating a local, experimental rule requiring
compulsory nonbinding arbitration); see also New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F.
Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that failure to follow court procedure requiring mandatory
arbitration precluded defendant from demanding a de novo trial). A federal appellate court upheld a
local rule requiring mandatory mediation on the ground that since it was not inconsistent with any
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure it was authorized under Rule 83. Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767
F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1985). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit refused to uphold an order requiring a
party to participate in a nonbinding summary jury trial, finding neither inherent nor Rule 16 authority for
the order. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88 (7th Cir. 1988).
94. The analysis of legislative history with respect to ADR is particularly unclear because the
CJRA passed as part of broader legislation including other titles; some of these included provisions on
ADR. Early versions of the CJRA, such as Senate Bill 2027, included broader powers to adopt ADR.
But Congress ultimately narrowed these powers. See S. 2648, supra note 14 (making the CJRA Title I
of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990). Earlier versions of Title III of the Judicial Improvements
Act, such as the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, also contained provi-
sions relating to ADR. For an analysis of this history, see Dayton, supra note 89, at 949-50. However,
when Congress decided only to implement the "noncontroversial" recommendations of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, lawmakers deleted the Title IlI provisions concerning ADR. H.R. REP. No.
734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990). No evidence in the legislative history supports the assertion that
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extreme caution in authorizing mandatory referrals to ADR in the federal
courts, due to concerns about the effects of additional costs on litigants and
about the potential effect on the exercise of the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in civil actions. 95 Nevertheless, the authorization given in the text to
"refer" appropriate cases to ADR forms a stronger basis for a claim for such
authority than does Rule 16(c)(7), which simply suggests discussing "the possi-
bility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute,
at least with respect to the ADR procedures listed in the statute." 96
A second question is whether the CJRA permits courts to adopt arbitration
programs.97 This issue requires consideration of both the statutory text and the
CJRA's interaction with previous legislation. First, the Act allows courts to
include "authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolu-
tion programs that-(A) have been designated for use in a district court; or (B)
the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and summary
jury trial."98 It does not mention arbitration as one of the ADR techniques that
a court "may make available." 99 An earlier version of the Act provided much
broader authority for ADR and included arbitration as one of the forms of ADR
a court could "make available." 100 This earlier version differs importantly from
deleting the ADR provisions from the Federal Courts Study Committee bill affected the language of the
CJRA.
The evidence on the issue of mandatory reference is ambiguous. Both the Senate and the House
Reports cite Hume v. M&C Mgmt., 129 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that federal
district judges lack authority to summon persons to serve as summary jurors), and state that the CJRA
would "eliminate any doubt [about the authority to conduct summary jury trials] that might exist in
some courts." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 57; H.R. REP. No. 732, supra note 72, at 15. But see
Dayton, supra note 89, at 950 (noting that Hume involved a voluntary summary jury trial requested by
the parties, and cannot, therefore, answer clearly whether courts can require participation in the listed
ADR devices).
95. Compare, for instance, the procedural safeguards Congress enacted when it authorized the use
of mandatory arbitration in some districts in 1988. Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7). Professor Dayton argues that Rule 16 is extremely weak authority
for the proposition that districts can adopt court-annexed ADR procedures on a district wide basis, since
the rule refers only to discussing the use of "extrajudicial" procedures. Dayton, supra note 89, at 934.
Dayton also points out that courts have looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83-allowing local
rules not inconsistent with national rules-for authority to institute such procedures. Id. at 938-43
(rejecting this interpretation of Rule 83); see also David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal
Civil Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PuGer
SoUND L. REv. 537, 544-45 (1985) (describing local rules authorizing mandatory ADR as "violently at
odds" with the entire structure of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
97. Several courts which previously had not utilized arbitration programs have created them in
their plans. JUDICIAL CoNErPENCE REPORT, supra note 5, ex. C (reporting that the Southern District of
California implemented mandatory ADR, including arbitration, for certain cases while the Northern
District of Georgia and the Northern District of Ohio implemented mandatory and voluntary nonbinding
arbitration, respectively). 28 U.S.C. § 658(1) did not designate any of these courts among those permit-
ted to employ mandatory arbitration procedures.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
99. Id.
100. Senate Bill 2027 required that each plan have
[a] comprehensive program providing for adjudication and, in appropriate cases, alternative
dispute resolution, which would make available to the parties and their counsel the full range
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation, arbitration, minitrial, and
summary jury trial. If such program includes the mandatory reference of certain cases to an
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what appears in the final Act: Not only has arbitration been removed from the
list of authorized ADR programs, but the enacted legislation adds a reference to
ADR programs "designated for use" in a particular court. 01 While the two
sections potentially overlap-a court could "designate for use" a form of ADR
not listed as one it could "make available"' 2-the more plausible reading of
this language requires resort to a broader statutory framework.
There are two possible readings. First, the CJRA itself designates certain
courts as "demonstration districts," requiring them to implement some of the
principles, techniques, and guidelines mentioned in section 473(a) and (b).
Three of the demonstration districts must "experiment with various methods of
reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, including alternative dispute resolu-
tion, that such district courts and the Judicial Conference of the United States
shall select."' 03 The "designation" in section 473(a)(6)(A) could, therefore,
refer to this section of the Act. Since the courts and the Judicial Conference are
not directed to any particular ADR programs, it is plausible to read the section
as allowing broad experimentation with all forms of ADR, including arbitra-
tion, but only in three districts.
The second possibility requires a broader statutory inquiry. In 1988, Con-
gress enacted legislation authorizing a limited experiment in arbitration in
twenty trial courts.1 4 That legislation designated those courts to refer certain
cases to arbitration programs they themselves conducted as a prerequisite to
trial. 1 5 Thus, "designation" as used in the CJRA might refer to courts selected
under this earlier legislation to experiment with arbitration.10 6 If so, the Act
does not expand the use of arbitration beyond the experimental districts desig-
nated in the earlier statute.
The 1988 legislation is explicitly experimental. Authorization for the arbi-
tration program remained subject to repeal in 1993 and achieved only provi-
sional renewal. 107 Only ten of the twenty courts authorized to operate
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, provision shall be made for motions to exempt a
case from the mandated procedure.
S. 2027, supra note 14, § 471(b)(10).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
102. I have been unable to find any legislative materials on this point.
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992) (reproducing Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104(b)(2),
104 Stat. 5089, 5097 (1990), as amended by Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-572, § 505, 106 Stat. 4506, 4513 (1992)).
104. Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988). The 1988
legislation extends an experimental program dating from an 1978 experiment in three district courts
initiated by the Department of Justice. In 1984, Congress authorized an additional eight districts to
participate in the 1978 arbitration programs. H.R. RP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1988).
Congress increased to 20 the number of districts authorized to participate in court-annexed arbitration
programs in 28 U.S.C. § 658 (1988). For a description of some of these programs, see E. ALLAN LIND
& JOHN E. SHAPARD, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DisTwcr COURTS (1981); Robel, supra note 89, at 24-25.
105. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988). The statute limits the kinds of cases that may be referred
to arbitration without the consent of the parties. Id. § 652(b) (explaining that courts may refer civil
cases only where money damages not in excess of $100,000 are sought).
106. The 1988 Act lists the courts authorized to use arbitration. hd § 658.
107. The 1988 legislation required that the arbitration program expire "5 years after the date of
enactment of this Act." Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
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arbitration programs can require parties to participate. 108 The cases for referral
also remain limited: The statute exempted cases involving complex or novel
legal issues, or in which legal issues predominated. 10 9 The legislation also pro-
tects claims based on violations of federal rights from mandatory arbitration 1
and carefully details the right to seek trial de novo after an arbitration award-
the latter since the ultimate passage of the legislation hinged, in part, on preser-
vation of litigants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.' Finally, the
Federal Judicial Center continually evaluates the statutory arbitration
programs. 112
The CJRA should be read with the 1988 legislation in mind, and arbitration
authority should be limited (if it is found to exist at all) to the three demonstra-
tion districts the CJRA authorized to experiment with ADR. Nothing in the
text warrants a broader reading, and the legislative history, with its express
deletion of arbitration authority, offers no additional support.
3. Summary.
None of the principles, techniques, or guidelines discussed so far authorize
broad procedural innovation in the mandated expense and delay reduction
plans. Instead, the CJRA pairs encouragement of judges to use case-manage-
ment tools already available with a modest and self-conscious expansion of
those tools. The Act also clarifies the courts' power to adopt certain kinds of
ADR techniques.
B. The Argument for Broad Rulemaking Power
There are two arguments in support of viewing the CJRA as a broad delega-
tion of rulemaking authority to local courts. First, it could be argued that by
styling the statutory case-management procedures as "principles" or "guide-
lines," Congress revealed a desire to view these procedures as exemplars for
further innovation. However, the specificity of the directions in the Act and the
history of the legislation discussed below weaken this position.
A stronger argument emerges from the text of section 473(b). After outlin-
ing five "techniques" that might be adopted by trial courts, section 473(b)(6)
§ 906, 102 Stat. 4642, 4664 (1988). On December 14, 1993, Congress extended that deadline to De-
cember 31, 1994. Judicial Arbitration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-192, § 1(a), 107 Stat. 2292, 2292
(1993) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 651 note).
108. Section 657(a) authorizes district courts named in § 658(1) to refer cases to arbitration. It is
not a blanket license, however. See notes 109-110 infra and accompanying text. Courts described in
§ 658(2) may only send cases to arbitration with the parties' consent.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 652(c) (1988).
110. Id. § 652(b) (precluding referring such cases without the consent of the parties).
111. Id. § 655; see, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 714
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (upholding a compulsory arbitration program against a 7th Amendment challenge);
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566,568-71 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that a local rule mandat-
ing arbitration for cases seeking less than $50,000 in damages is not so burdensome as to interfere with
the 7th Amendment right).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 651 note (1988); see BARBARA MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DisTucr CouRTs (1990) (reporting to Congress pursuant to the
1988 legislation).
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states that the trial court plan may include "such other features as the district
court considers appropriate after considering the recommendations of the advi-
sory group."' 1 3 Nonetheless, this provision's history reveals that Congress did
not intend to confer broad authority to experiment with procedures believed
helpful in reducing cost and delay without regard for their consistency with the
Federal Rules.
The earliest version of the CJRA, Senate Bill 2027,114 did not provide for
any local control over the content of expense and delay reduction plans. As
explained above, the legislation was based on a task force report critical of
federal judges' reluctance to use the case-management tools provided by the
1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 15 Had this first
version of the Act passed, each district would have been required to adopt a
number of detailed case-management measures, including an elaborate case-
tracking system. 16 Hence, while the bill contained a statement about local
court flexibility in its findings, it cautioned that flexibility had to be exercised
"within certain well-defined and uniformly applied parameters. 11t7 In truth,
there was very little room for local flexibility in Senate Bill 2027, a fact that
was cited as a virtue by one of its chief supporters." 8
The Judicial Conference voiced its opposition to the proposed legislation.
First, judges questioned the wisdom of imposing such detailed case-manage-
ment requirements on courts across the country irrespective of the nature of
their caseloads or the speed of their dockets.' 19 In fact, most of the opposition
from the Judicial Conference and various bar groups concerned the mandatory
case-management requirements. Thus, the focus of their lobbying was on al-
lowing trial judges greater discretion under the Act.' 20
113. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992).
114. S. 2027, supra note 14.
115. BROOKINOS REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. This criticism is repeated in the findings accompa-
nying the bill. See S. 2027, supra note 14, § 2(15).
116. For instance, Senate Bill 2027 would have required every trial district to adopt a "differenti-
ated system of case management" that would "assign cases ... to appropriate processing tracks that
operate under distinct and explicit rules, procedures and timeframes for the completion of discovery and
for trial." S. 2027, supra note 14, § 471(b)(1)(B). This case-tracking system was to be implemented
through a system of classification at intake: "[C]ases shall be classified on intake through an expanded
civil cover sheet, which the clerk of each district court, designated track coordinator or other person to
whom track assignment responsibilities have been delegated would use in making the initial track as-
signment." Id. § 471(b)(2)(B). The system would be coupled with an elaborate set of mechanisms to
resolve disputes over track assignments. Id. § 471(b)(2)(C). The procedures for cases on the complex
track were outlined in detail in the bill. Id. § 471(b)(3).
117. S. 2027, supra note 14, § 2(12); cf. BRoocu's REPORT, supra note 12, at 10-11.
118. The fact that Senate Bill 2027 would have increased uniformity among district courts was
central to the argument in its favor presented by Patrick Head, Vice-President and General Counsel of
FMC Corporation and one of four nonjudge witnesses testifying in its favor. Head's prepared statement
noted that a significant cost associated with having a national practice is the need to "identify and
comply with diverse local court rules .... Consequently, any procedural reform that would increase
procedural uniformity among federal courts would represent a direct savings to us." Hearings, supra
note 34, at 22, 23 (statement of Patrick Head).
119. See id. at 333-34 (statement of Judge Robert F. Peckham); see also Robel, supra note 12, at
128-29 (detailing the opposition to the bill).
120. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 212 (testimony of Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.); id. at 335-
43 (statement of Judge Peckham); Diana E. Murphy, S. 2648, The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990:
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In addition, judges believed that the CJRA represented a dangerous devia-
tion from the rulemaking process envisioned in the Rules Enabling Act
(REA).' 21 The REA contemplates that committees of the Judicial Conference
will propose rule changes to the Conference, and that these proposals will be
transmitted to the Supreme Court and then, if approved, to Congress. 122 More-
over, pursuant to two provisions added in 1988 with the intent to open the
rulemaking process to public scrutiny, 123 the REA requires committees charged
with rulemaking responsibility to hold their meetings in public-after public
notice-to ensure that proposed rules are subject to comment before this trans-
mission. 124 Judges expressed particular concern over promulgating national
procedural norms without the careful deliberation, notice, and period for com-
ment that characterize rulemaking under the REA but which did not precede the
introduction of the CJRA.' 25
The first attempt to meet judicial concerns was in Senate Bill 2648, a modi-
fied version of Senate Bill 2027.126 Senate Bill 2648 represented a compro-
mise requiring courts to adopt the procedures listed in what is now section
473(a), while leaving them free to reject what is now section 473(b). 127 The
language allowing district courts to adopt "such other features as [they] con-
The concerns offederal judges, 74 JUoDicA-rur 112 (1990) (explaining her concerns, as the then-presi-
dent of the Federal Judges Association, about the bill's impact on case scheduling); see also Robel,
supra note 12, at 128; Ann Pelham, Shall vs. May: Judges Rebel Over One Word in Civil Reform Bill,
LEGAL TimEs, Oct. 15, 1990, at 6.
121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Individual judges and the Judicial Confer-
ence made their strongest statements of their concerns about deviating from the REA rulemaking pro-
cess during the hearings on Senate Bill 2648, the first legislative attempt to address some of the judges'
concerns. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 34, at 353-59 (statement of Judge Walter T. McGovern).
Representatives of the Judicial Conference first expressed these concerns, however, at the hearings on
Senate Bill 2027. See, e.g., id. at 221 (statement of Judge Robinson) ("These are procedural matters that
should be handled through the normal, Congressionally-mandated Rules Enabling Act process."). Sena-
tor Biden and his staff certainly knew the Conference's views on this matter already, as the Conference
had appointed a task force to work with the Judiciary Committee on the bill. Id. at 309-10 (statement of
Senator Biden).
122. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-2074 (1988).
123. The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 shortened 28 U.S.C. § 2072
and added 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073 and 2074. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-50 (1988).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1)-(2) (1988). See Judge Robert E. Keeton: A Look at Rulemaking in
the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANcH, Mar. 1993, at 10-11 (interview). Judge Keeton, the chairman of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, notes that the committee is
receiving a substantially increased number of comments. Id. at 11.
125. Judge Peckham explained the Judicial Conference's fears of harm to the rulemaking process:
Congress recently reviewed and re-codified that process, taking care to build into it procedures
that assure that before nationally applicable rules of procedure are imposed they are consid-
ered most deliberately by thoughtful and experienced judges, lawyers, and law professors over
a substantial period of time, and that the lawyers and litigants ... are given ample opportunity
to articulate their reactions, point out potential problems, and add suggestions. As we who
have sat on the bench for some time have discovered, sometimes painfully, procedural matters
are extraordinarily complex. They can not only influence, but fix, the outcome of litigation.
New rules can have a great many unforeseen consequences. And it takes the most considered
deliberation to be sure that the dynamic between new programs and established practices is
constructive. Thus it is crucial that inputs from all affected quarters be sought before proce-
dural change is imposed.
Hearings, supra note 34, at 333-34 (statement of Judge Peckham).
126. S. 2648, supra note 14.
127. Id. § 473(b).
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sider[ ] appropriate after considering the recommendations of the advisory
group,"128 first appears in Senate Bill 2648, but there is little mention and no
discussion of it in either the Senate or the House Reports accompanying the
Act.
But the fact that the entire legislative history lacks discussion of the lan-
guage argues against concluding that Congress intended to confer broad author-
ity to alter or ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 129 Granting such
authority would not have responded to judicial concerns and would have re-
sulted in an even more serious deviation from the rulemaking process than the
CJRA already represented. Instead, the timing of the language's appearance
suggests that its insertion was an attempt to assuage judges' concerns about
congressional "micromanagement" of the work of trial judges.130
Section 473(b)(3) was not intended to confer broad authority to develop
local procedures inconsistent with the Federal Rules. If it had, it would repre-
sent a dramatic departure from the ordinary rulemaking process-a departure
Congress had recently rejected.131 The continuing controversy over the use of
local rules under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the congressional
response to that controversy in 1988 reveals how dramatic a departure this
reading constitutes.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, district courts may promulgate
local rules "not inconsistent" with the Federal Rules. 132 The proliferation of
local rules, with their corresponding inconstancy to the text and spirit of the
Federal Rules, came under the scrutiny of both the Judicial Conference and the
Congress. 133 While the Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project engaged in
128. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992). Both congressional reports state that "subsection
(b)(6) allows each district court to consider any other provisions that it considers appropriate after con-
sidering the recommendations of its advisory group." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 59; H.R. REP.
No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990).
129. Moreover, language in the reports accompanying Senate Bill 2648 argues strongly against a
conclusion that the Senate precipitously changed direction from its earlier bill. The Senate Report that
accompanied the final, amended version of the bill argues that the legislation is necessary to provide
justice to all citizens through a "minimal level of efficiency and economy" that would allow judges
"sufficient time for... thoughtful and deliberate adjudication." S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 2.
130. See Hearings, supra note 34, at 349 (comments of Senator Biden); see also Ann Pelham,
Biden, Judges Negotiate Civil Reform, LEcAL TIMEs, May 14, 1990, at 7.
131. It is a truism of statutory construction that the law does not dramatically change unless Con-
gress says so explicitly. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-96 403-04 (1991). There is
nothing either in the explicit statutory text or the legislative history to suggest that Congress believed it
was altering the result of the 1988 legislation.
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. The Rule also empowers magistrates and judges to regulate practice "in
any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act," thus allowing for
even more localization of practice, all within the context of a set of national norms. Id.
133. In 1984, the Judicial Conference authorized its Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure to study and treat the problems that the local proliferation of rules causes. The following year, the
Conference empowered the Reporter of the Committee to collect and organize all the district court rules,
as well as other judicial commands that operate like rules, into one source. The Reporter was also
instructed to design a project to study the growing number of divergent local rules. This "Local Rules
Project" discovered that the 94 federal court districts had an aggregate of almost 5000 local rules, "not
including many 'sub-rules,' standing orders and standard operating procedures." COMMrrrEE ON RuLEs
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PRO-
jEcr: LOCAL RULEs ON CivI. PRACTICE 1 (1989).
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studying and cataloging the variety of local rules, lawmakers introduced
amendments to the statutory rulemaking power in Congress.' 34
The legislation, which passed in 1988, was intended to provide a significant
check on local rulemaking. 135 First, it requires "appropriate public notice and
an opportunity for comment" to precede the adoption of local rules.136 Second,
it formalizes a system of review of local district court rules by judicial councils
within a circuit, and authorizes those councils to abrogate local rules inconsis-
tent with the Federal Rules. 137 Third, the statute states that it is the exclusive
avenue for prescribing local rules, thereby attempting to avoid the promulga-
tion of the equivalent of local rules under various other rubrics, such as "stand-
ing orders."'138
The other changes the 1988 legislation imposed repeated the emphasis on
openness and accountability in the rulemaking process. Congress repealed the
old REA and replaced it with separate sections designed to open national
rulemaking to public scrutiny, and to give Congress a longer time period during
which it could interrupt the rule-establishing process.' 39
Thus, prior to the CJRA, Congress' most recent venture into the realm of
judicial rulemaking was to impose greater controls and more accountability on
rulemaking at every level of the federal courts. Against this background, it is
hardly plausible that the CJRA, which began its life as a bill giving no rulemak-
ing authority to local courts, could have been transformed into a charter for
local court independence, allowing courts to implement local procedures with-
out regard for either national norms or the notice and comment requirements so
recently enacted by Congress.' 40
Reading the CJRA to allow local procedural change in derogation of the
134. The text of the original rulemaking statute read as follows: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their
business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (Supp. 1952) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
135. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 403(a)(1),
102 Stat. 4642,4650 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1988).
137. Id. § 2071(c)(1). A subsequent and coordinate amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 332 requires that
the judicial councils perform a substantive review of these rules. Id. § 332(d)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
138. Id. § 2071(0 (1988).
139. Id. §§ 2072-2074.
140. The CJRA does not require notice and comment before implementation of a plan. Instead, it
requires that the advisory group report be "made available to the public." Id. § 472(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
Unlike the substantive review of local rules now required by § 332, the CJRA contains an extensive
review process but no obvious authority for the reviewers to do anything other than to make suggestions.
See id. § 474(a)(1) (providing that the chief judge of each district court and the chief judge of the court
of appeals for that circuit shall together "review each plan ... and make suggestions for additional
actions"); id. § 474(b)(2) (mandating that the Judicial Conference shall review each plan and "may
request the district court to take additional action if the Judicial Conference determines that such court
has not adequately responded to [relevant local conditions]").
The CJRA's legislative history contains an extensive discussion of the REA in response to the
Judicial Conference's concern that the CJRA represented an unwarranted congressional venture into
rulemaking, derogating the REA procedure. See S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 10-12. While the
Report contains a strong statement of congressional power to engage in rulemaking, there is no sugges-
tion that unabridged local rulemaking-a recent concern of Congress-is being instated.
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Federal Rules would also place the Act in tension with the recently revised 28
U.S.C. § 2071. As noted above, the purpose of section 2071 was to assure that
all local rulemaking-by whatever name-remain consistent with the Federal
Rules and other congressional enactments. Although it is possible to harmo-
nize the CJRA and section 2071 by assuming that plan provisions containing
directions to lawyers should be implemented through local rules, 141 this reading
would not, of course, aid those seeking expanded rulemaking authority. Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which authorizes local rules, and section 2071
both require that local rules not conflict with either the Federal Rules or other
federal laws.
To be sure, the legislative reports contain somewhat ambiguous1 42 discus-
sions of "building reform that proceeds from 'the bottom up.' "143 Indeed,
some Senate Report statements might be read as encouraging local procedural
innovation. The Report quotes approvingly from the testimony of Judge Robert
Peckham that " '[s]ome of the most important reforms that have happened in
the federal judicial system have been locally created and have been spread
throughout and later adopted.' " The Report continues: "That notion, quite
simply, lies at the heart of [the CJRA]." 144
While it is possible that these remarks reveal that Congress embraced local
proceduralism, such a conclusion is unlikely. Rather, the Report notes Judge
Peckham's complaint that locally created innovations experience ineffective
dissemination. The report then states that the CJRA, by assuring a "sys-
temwide approach," overcomes this problem. 145 Further, the Report's lengthy
discussion of the case-management techniques the Act actually contained sug-
gests that the sponsors believed the CJRA embodied and codified the best of
the local reforms to which Judge Peckham referred.' 46
Moreover, statements that appear to support local procedural innovation
must be viewed in the context of the whole report, which emphasizes the
CJRA's necessity on the basis that it represents a national strategy, premised on
"general and widely accepted principles of litigation management and cost re-
duction."147 The congressional belief that local courts should exert a degree of
control over whether to implement the techniques the Act suggested does not
141. The CJRA does not define "implementation." Thus, a requirement that such provisions go
through the ordinary process for local rulemaking would not offend the legislation.
142. It is clear that Congress envisioned factfinding as the primary local role. For instance, the
purpose of the advisory groups is to assure that local problems are thoroughly identified. S. REP. No.
416, supra note 64, at 14-15 (indicating that "legislation allows for a 'determination of problems in local
areas to be made at the local level ... as opposed to a broad-based national level' "(quoting Hearings,
supra note 34, at 27 (statement of Bill Wagner)). Congress also hoped that the advisory groups' partici-
pation would encourage local support for the plans. Id. at 15-16; see also Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots
Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 60 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 879
(1994) (describing the evolving conception of the advisory groups' role under the CJRA).
143. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 14 (quoting 136 CONG. Rvc. S416 (daily ed. Jan. 25,
1990) (statement of Senator Biden)).
144. Id. at 15 (quoting Hearings, supra note 34, at 315 (testimony of Judge Peckham)).
145. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 16-30.
147. Id. at 30. In an attempt to forestall the proposed legislation, the Judicial Conference adopted
a "Fourteen Point Program" of case management. The program, however, failed to obviate the need for
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support the larger proposition that Congress approved the adoption of plans
inconsistent with other federal laws. The legislative record does not mention
the need for, or the authorization of, such power.
What, then, was intended by section 473(b)(6)? One can begin to give it
content by recognizing that the primary concern motivating judges opposed to
earlier bills was the desire to maintain flexibility in managing their dockets. 14s
Many management strategies are not obvious subjects for rulemaking. Courts,
for example, might adopt internal operating procedures specifying how to as-
sign cases if one judge develops a backlog of motions. A court could similarly
decide to assign visiting judges solely to criminal cases so as to expedite civil
cases.1 49 Moreover, the required advisory group assessment might recommend
that a court struggling with timely decision of motions prioritize them or adopt
a policy of rescheduling trial dates when the court fails to decide motions
within twenty days of trial. 150 An advisory group might also suggest new trial-
scheduling strategies.
The point is that a huge layer of case management has never been thought a
rulemakers' concern. 15 ' This is the aspect of trial court management that
judges worried about protecting, in part because it is probably the most sensi-
tive to local conditions. Senate Bill 2027 provoked controversy not because it
contained amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; it didn't. In-
stead, it included instructions to federal trial judges directed at exactly this
docket-management layer of procedure-requirements that judges create case
tracks or schedule trials in a certain way. These innovations in docket-manage-
ment procedure embodied the "micromanagement" about which judges com-
plained. They knew from experience that case tracking did not make sense in
rural districts and that a statutory command to schedule all civil trials within
eighteen months, for instance, could wreak havoc with the docket of a court
burdened with drug prosecutions. 152
Section 473(b)(6) thus embodies a workable compromise. It allows judicial
discretion in the areas where it has traditionally existed, but gives the courts the
benefit of an "outside look," by advisory groups, at their internal procedures. It
is not, nor was it intended to be, a charter for local rulemaking.
legislation-indeed, the Senate Report states that the program itself demonstrates "why a legislative
approach is needed." Id.
148. See note 121 supra.
149. See JUDICIAL CONwERaECE REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-14.
150. See U.S. DisTRiCr COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DisTicr OF INDIANA, REPORT OF THE CIvI.
JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP 48-50 (1991) [hereinafter INDIANA PLAN] (recommending prioritization of
motions and rescheduling trial dates).
151. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-especially the amendments
to Rule 16-were intended to prod judges into active case management at an earlier point in the litiga-
tion. See MILLER, supra note 84, at 21 (revealing that an informal survey indicated that one- to two-
thirds of federal trial judges already participated in active case management prior to the amendments).
But like most rulemaking, these amendments exist not only to strengthen judges' powers, but also to
clarify lawyers' duties, from preparation to discuss settlement to participation in a case management
plan discussion. In contrast, court procedures concerning trial settings, case-assignment practices, or
motions priorities all affect lawyers, but do not impose duties upon them.
152. See Murphy, supra note 120, at 112, 114; see also Hearings, supra note 34, at 360-61 (testi-
mony of Judge Diana E. Murphy).
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C. Beyond the Federal Rules: Substance in the Plans
While concern about deviations from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
remains acute, there are perhaps more serious questions to address. The plan
adopted by the Eastern District of Texas, for instance, caps contingency fees
and limits expenses chargeable to clients, 153 despite the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncements that matters of cost and fee allocation are "for the legislature, not
the courts." 154 Other plans contain similarly substantive provisions. 155
The distinction between "substance" and "procedure," though central to the
REA, is an elusive 156 yet functional concept. 157 The Eastern District of Texas
announced its goal in capping attorneys' fees-and it is the same substantive
goal announced by the Congress in the CJRA: cutting the costs of civil litiga-
tion. 158 That goal involves-or should involve-weighing a number of sub-
stantive policies, including access to attorneys for those unable to pay standard
rates as well as the cap's effect on the availability of legal services. The Texas
court argues that the CJRA assumes that a reduction in legal activity during
discovery will reduce costs, but notes that this will not benefit contingency fee
153. Article V of the Texas Plan bases the caps on the underlying assumption of the CJRA that
reducing legal activity during discovery through a plan will reduce the cost to litigants who pay for legal
services on an hourly basis.
Whether such presumed reductions become a reality remains to be seen .... However, no
such reduction from these measures will inure to the benefit of litigants who retain counsel on
a contingency fee basis. The court, therefore, adopts the following maximum fee schedule for
contingency fee cases (whether filed originally in this court or removed from state court):
(1) Contingent fees in non-statutory cases:
A fee of 33-1/3% of the total award or settlement.
(2) Expenses:
Expenses incurred by attorneys that are directly related to the costs of litigation of indi-
vidual cases shall be deducted from the award or settlement before any calculation or distribu-
tion is made for attorneys' fees. No deduction is permitted for general office overhead
expenses. Moreover, attorneys are prohibited from charging interest on any money advanced
for expenses.
TExAs PLAN, supra note 39, at 7-8.
154. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (rejecting a
postjudgment interest rule that would date interest from the verdict, rather than the judgment, and noting
that "the allocation of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the legislature, not the courts");
see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (holding that only
Congress can make an exception to the "American rule" for fee allocation and that "it would be inappro-
priate for the Judiciary, without legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in [this
way]").
155. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 40, at 1421 (noting Montana's plan to establish an attorney
review committee).
156. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (arguing that the Constitution's crea-
tion of the federal courts "carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either");
Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L.J. 281
(exploring the meanings of "substance" and "procedure"). John Hart Ely noted some time ago that
"procedural" rules can affect "substantive rights." John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARv. L. REv. 693, 724 (1974).
157. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 7, at 1190 ("[Ilf lawmaking in an area necessarily involves
the consideration of public policy-policies extrinsic to the process of litigation-the choices in that
area are for Congress." (footnote omitted)).
158. TEXAs PLAN, supra note 39, at 7.
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clients. 159 While the court is correct in its assumptions, the Act by its terms
does not affect the Texas court policy. Nor is it obvious that it empowers the
Texas court to do so.160
The statutory tasks allotted to the civil justice advisory groups, as well as
the groups' composition, do not suggest that Congress viewed them as compe-
tent to weigh sensitive policy.' 6 ' As noted above, their charge is to assess the
docket and to recommend measures to the courts. Detailed statutory language
limits their discretion in making recommendations. While the groups should
reflect the various constituencies who use the courts, there is no requirement
that they do so.' 62 Nothing suggests that advisory group functions should in-
clude choosing between competing, and compelling, public values.
The CJRA's dual goals of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation while
increasing access to justice require difficult and controversial weighing of com-
peting policies. Congressional rulemaking control has always been premised
on concerns about the allocation of federal powers, and, in particular, on a
concern that the legislature, not the courts, engage in "policy choices with a
predictable and identifiable impact on rights claimed under substantive law."' 63
Despite its ambitious title, the relatively modest provisions of the CJRA do not
arrogate to local federal judges-with or without advisory groups-the power
to effect substantive reforms of this nature. From its conception through its
enactment, the CJRA was much too suspicious of federal judges to accommo-
date such a reading.
IV. THE CONSTrTUTIONALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL RULEMAKING
Of course, a close reading of the statutory text is unnecessary if the CJRA
was beyond Congress' power to enact in the first place. In a recent article,
Professor Linda Mullenix argues exactly that. She asserts that in enacting the
CJRA, Congress violated constitutional separation of powers norms, arguing
that the CJRA has "effectively repealed the Rules Enabling Act... [and] has
by flat stripped the judicial branch of a power that uniquely bears on the federal
judicial function: the power to prescribe internal rules of procedure for the
159. Id.
160. Interestingly, Judge Robert Parker, the former Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas,
also chairs the Judicial Conference's Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, the
body charged with overseeing the CJRA's implementation.
161. See Robel, supra note 142, at 896-904 (describing the actual composition of advisory groups
appointed under the CJRA and arguing that the groups' makeup does not ensure consideration of diverse
viewpoints).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 478 (Supp. IV 1992) (describing the appointment process for members); see
Robel, supra note 142, at 893-96 (describing a nationwide survey of advisory group members and
concluding that the groups do not effectively represent all constituencies of the federal courts).
163. Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1012, 1019-20. I agree with Burbank's argu-
ment that "when the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an
enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in
which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common law." Id. at 1021.
Professor Burbank elaborates upon his reading of the REA in Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discre-
tion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NoTRE DAME L. Rv. 693, 700-10
(1988).
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federal courts." 164 In her view, the CJRA took "procedural rulemaking power
away from judges and their expert advisers and delegated it to local law-
yers."165 In addition, Professor Mullenix posits that the REA creates a statu-
tory limitation on Congress' rulemaking power that Congress cannot ignore.1 66
However, neither the Constitution nor the REA place the type of constraints
Professor Mullenix suggests on Congress' involvement in rulemaking.
A. Does the CJRA Violate Separation of Powers?
Professor Mullenix states: "My thesis is simple: the Civil Justice Reform
Act revokes the Rules Enabling Act and authorizes unconstitutional rulemak-
ing. The Act violates the separation of powers doctrine and substantially im-
pairs the ability of the federal courts to control their internal processes and the
conduct of civil litigation." 167 Implicit in this argument are two controversial
assertions: (1) that the Constitution requires the current REA division of labor
between the judiciary and the legislative branch; and (2) that the Constitution
mandates that the federal courts control their "internal processes" free of con-
gressional supervision. I disagree with both assertions. Moreover, the CJRA
does not violate Professor Mullenix's interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine, even if it were justified, because the Act leaves the judiciary holding
ultimate control over the content of the civil justice reform plans.
By statute, federal procedural rules are initiated by the judicial branch168
subject to congressional approval. 169 The familiar statutory allocation of power
between Congress and the courts relies on the distinction between substance
and procedure: As has been the case since the first REA was passed in
1934,170 the Supreme Court is free to "prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure" so long as those rules do "not abridge, enlarge, or modify any sub-
stantive right." 171
164. Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 8, at 379.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 424. The Senate described Congress' rulemaking authority as both plenary and exclu-
sive, a position that need not be accepted in order to accept the CJRA. Id. (citing S. RP. No. 416, supra
note 64, at 10). Professor Mullenix states that the Senate's argument on the rulemaking allocation issue
"fails to recognize that the Rules Enabling Act has clearly assigned substantive rulemaking power to
Congress and procedural rulemaking power to the federal courts. In essence, then, the Rules Enabling
Act governs and limits congressional rulemaking power." Id. at 427.
167. Id. at 382.
168. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2073 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
169. Id. § 2074. "Congressional approval" may misdescribe the process. Since the 1988 Rules
Enabling Act amendments, rules proposed by the Court under § 2072 or § 2073 go into effect unless
Congress acts to prevent their implementation within seven months after the Chief Justice reports the
proposed rules to Congress. Id. § 2074(a).
170. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a)-(b) (1988). Professor Burbank explains:
The historical evidence compels the view that the limitations imposed by the famous first
two sentences of the [Rules Enabling] Act
[The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe by
general rules ... the forms of process, writs, pleading, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant.
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In order to assess this arrangement's constitutionality, one must ascertain
the constitutional source of the power to make procedural rules. The Supreme
Court recognizes three general sources of judicial power. First, Article H de-
fines the exercise of judicial power as primarily confined to deciding "cases"
and "controversies."'172 Second, the Court recognizes that Article I gives Con-
gress limited power to delegate to the judiciary powers beyond the Article HI
powers, so long as the delegation does not threaten "an independent and impar-
tial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of
the United States,"'173 assign "tasks that are more properly accomplished by
[other] branches,"'174 or otherwise " 'impermissibly threaten[ ] the institu-
tional integrity of the Judicial Branch.' "175 Third, the Court maintains that
federal courts have "inherent" authority to exercise certain nonadjudicatory
powers. t7 6
The Supreme Court, then, has identified two specific sources of judicial
rulemaking power. It primarily describes its ability to promulgate general rules
of procedure as congressionally delegated. Article EI offers a second, in-
dependent, albeit limited, source of rulemaking power. Congress' authority to
adopt the CJRA, then, depends on the extent the Constitution requires judicial
participation in rulemaking. In turn, what the Constitution requires depends on
the relationship between the power the Court views as delegated and the power
it describes as either explicit in Article HI or inherent.
were intended to allocate power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress and
thus to circumscribe the delegation of legislative power ....
Burbank, supra note 7, at 1025 (quoting 48 Stat. at 1064).
172. The Supreme Court has explained:
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases"
and "controversies." ... [The "case or controversy" requirement defines with respect to the
Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded
.... The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal judicial power in
our system of government.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2); see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (holding that an independent counsel's subpoena power does not
violate either Article III or the separation of powers doctrine); Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975) (enumerating standing requirements to gain access to federal court adjudication); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 101-06 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge the expenditure of federal funds to
purchase textbooks for a parochial school).
173. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (upholding Con-
gress' grant to the Commission of jurisdiction over common law counterclaims); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) (asking whether the challenged practice " 'prevents the Execu-
tive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions' " (quoting Nixon v. Administra-
tor of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977))); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 683-84 (upholding the
constitutionality of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act's independent counsel provisions).
174. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 680-81.
175. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 383 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851).
176. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46-49 (1991) (discussing the inherent
power to sanction litigants for bad faith conduct); Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (discussing the inherent power to initiate contempt proceedings and to appoint
counsel to prosecute them); In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) (explaining the inherent power to
suspend or disbar attorneys). For the most part, this asserted inherent authority is consistent with a
vision of separated powers that recognizes the courts' need to be able to protect the integrity of their
processes without undue reliance on the political branches. See, e.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 796 ('The
ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has
a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches.").
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Article III's "case or controversy" requirement is not an obvious source for
a general judicial rulemaking power-at least not as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The Court might have viewed Article III's command that the
federal courts adjudicate cases as implicitly granting courts the power to create
rules of general application in order to govern that adjudication. The Court has
not done so. Instead, it describes Article I's requirements in terms of the
quality of the dispute presented for adjudication and the relationship of the
litigants to that dispute.177
The Court describes its ability to make rules of general application as a
delegated power.1 78 Chief Justice Marshall first identified the Necessary and
Proper Clause 179 as the source of this power, stating that "Congress may cer-
tainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
itself."180 Chief Justice Marshall was convinced that it was within Congress'
power to make rules of procedure "without the intervention of the Courts."1 81
Thus, it was clear that Congress could "delegate to the courts the power of
altering the modes ... of proceedings in suits."18 2
In fact, for most of our early history, "Congress, rather than the Supreme
Court, played the leading role in determining what procedural rules the
177. See note 172 supra.
178. To the extent that rulemaking is not described as a delegated power, it is discussed as an
aspect of inherent authority (or "supervisory power"). See, e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 225 (1946) (forbidding discriminatory jury selection processes under the Court's "power of super-
vision over the administration of justice in the federal courts").
179. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 18. This clause gives Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof." Id.
180. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (discussing congressional power to
regulate the proceedings of the federal courts).
181. Id. at 143. In evaluating the constitutionality of a 1793 act granting courts the power to draw
up rules in order to conduct their business, Chief Justice Marshall concluded:
It will certainly not be contended, that this might not be done by congress. The courts, for
example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declara-
tions and other pleading, and other things of the same description. It will not be contended,
that these things might not be done by the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts;
yet it is not alleged, that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id.; see also Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835) (holding that in authorizing
Congress to create the lower federal courts, Article III also authorized Congress to create modes of
procedure for those courts).
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federal courts would follow.' 1 8 3 In addition to enacting the Judiciary Act,' 84
beginning in 1789, Congress directed the federal courts to borrow state proce-
dures through the various Conformity Acts' 85 and adopted acts authorizing the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules in equity and admiralty. 186 In the absence
of statutes on point, "the Supreme Court tended to construe the federal courts'
authority narrowly, concluding that Congress must have intended the federal
courts to follow the local procedural rules when it had not provided
otherwise."' 87
Reiterating its holding that Congress may confer rulemaking authority on
the judiciary, the Court in Mistretta v. United States188 traced the history of
judicial rulemaking under the REA, quoting its earlier language from Sibbach
v. Wilson: " 'Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and proce-
dure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or
constitution of the United States.' 1'89 The Court has recognized that it is exer-
cising a delegated power not only when it makes rules of general application
under the various enabling acts, but also when exercising administrative power
through the judicial councils and the Administrative Office of the United States
183. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 1433, 1436 (1984). Con-
gress has recently shown renewed interest in direct involvement in the civil rules. See Laurens Walker,
A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 455, 460-62 (1993)
(describing congressional amendments of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 35, and 37). And if one
looks beyond the narrow confines of civil procedure, Congress appears to remain involved in procedural
rulemaking in numerous other areas. For example, half of the amendments subsequent to Congress'
1975 passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence have originated in Congress, not in any judicial branch
rulemaking committee. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 857,
859 (1992). In 1974, Congress also "enacted a year-long postponement of the effectiveness of amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," in order to ensure a "meaningful congressional
review of the issues raised by those rules." Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time
for Re-Examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579 (1975).
184. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Professor Beale notes that several sections of the
Judiciary Act regulated procedure. Beale, supra note 183, at 1436. See Judiciary Act §§ 9(d), 29, 30,
33, 1 Stat. at 77, 88, 91 (relating to jury trial, venue in capital cases, jury selection, oral testimony,
depositions, and bail).
185. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (directing federal courts to follow the proce-
dures used in state courts in their geographic areas); Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278 (extending
the 1789 Conformity Act to newly admitted states).
186. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (extending the Conformity Act to equity
cases); Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518 (authorizing the Supreme Court to promul-
gate rules for admiralty cases); see Burbank, supra note 7, at 1037 n.90.
187. Beale, supra note 183, at 1438. Thus, Professor Mullenix's claims that Congress has not
participated in procedural rulemaking and that the Supreme Court's recognition of congressional
rulemaking power appears only in "dicta in two Supreme Court cases construing the Rules Enabling
Act" are incorrect. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 1327.
188. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
189. Id. at 387 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) (finding that plaintiff
must submit to a court-ordered physical examination)); see also id. at 386 n.14 (stating that "rulemaking
power originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by
the Legislature to the Executive Branch").
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Courts.190 These powers, while not defined in Article II, may be delegated to
the courts because they "do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch
and... are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary." 19 1
From our earliest history, then, and despite the protestations of a celebrated
scholar,192 the Court has described its rulemaking power as delegated.193 In
fact, both scholars and justices 194 have questioned whether the courts should
have accepted the delegation: Rulemaking is neither "part of the case adjudica-
tion process" nor "ancillary" to that process' 95 and therefore exposes the judici-
ary to involvement in essentially political decisions-at a cost to the protection
from politics a strict interpretation of Article I provides the judiciary.
More than history, however, supports the Court's position that Congress has
"undoubted power"'19 6 to regulate federal court procedures. Judicial procedures
190. Id. at 388-89.
191. Id. at 388.
192. Dean Wigmore believed the rulemaking power belonged to the Court alone. John H. Wig-
more, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276
(1928). Other commentators agree in part with Dean Wigmore's arguments. See Charles W. Joiner &
Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv.
623, 630 (1957) (arguing that courts have inherent, and supreme, authority to prescribe rules "for the
establishment and maintenance of the machinery essential for the efficient administration of judicial
business"). Dean Pound, while agreeing that rulemaking is an inherent judicial function, believed that
Wigmore's constitutional position could not be sustained in the face of 75 years of legislative rulemak-
ing and Court acquiescence. Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599,
601 (1926). For an analysis and rejection of Wigmore's position, see Michael M. Martin, Inherent
Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEx. L. REv.
167, 192-193 (1979).
193. Professor Beale notes that "[a]lthough the records of the Constitutional Convention and the
debates on ratification shed little light on the question whether the grant of judicial power conferred the
exclusive authority to formulate procedural rules, both Congress and the Supreme Court have consist-
ently viewed congressional regulation of judicial procedural matters as appropriate." Beale, supra note
183, at 1466 (footnote omitted). Beale notes the argument that "the framers felt no need to define 'the
judicial Power' because they accepted as their general model the English and colonial courts, which
formulated their own rules of procedure and evidence." Id. at 1466 n.217. However, she rejects that
argument because "the overall structure of the Constitution implies certain limits on the federal courts
which did not limit the powers that were exercised by the English and colonial courts," such as the
restriction against recognizing federal common law crimes. Id.
194. In a famous statement, Justices Black and Douglas voiced their opposition to the Court's
promulgation of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "many [of which] determine
matters so substantially affecting the rights of litigants in lawsuits that in practical effect they are the
equivalent of new legislation which... the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the
Congress and approved by the President." Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 374 U.S. 861, 865-66 (1963) (dissenting statement of Black & Douglas, JJ.)
(footnotes omitted).
195. MARnrN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENsIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
PowER 21 (2d ed. 1990). After showing that Article Ill does not justify the power to promulgate federal
rules, Professor Redish notes that such rules
operate on all litigants, with the binding effect of law. The Court's function in the process of
promulgation of the Rules today virtually amounts to the adoption of legislation. Thus, in
promulgating the Rules for congressional approval, the Court is inherently intertwined in the
legislative process. One could reasonably ask, what activity could represent a more striking
departure from the tradition judicial function of case adjudication than a direct and immediate
role in the enactment of legislation?
Id. As Professor Redish laments, however, the Court would not likely agree that the delegation here
exceeds that allowed in Morrison or Mistretta. Id. at 22.
196. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,473
(1965) (explaining that "Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress
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influence the determination of substantive rights. The indeterminate division
between substantive and adjective law argues for a strong congressional role in
rulemaking, both because Congress is a democratically elected, policymaking
branch, 197 and because the Supreme Court's decision to accept or reject proce-
dural revisions is final.
The cases accepting congressional power to engage in procedural rulemak-
ing have long coexisted with cases authorizing certain acts on the basis of "in-
herent" judicial power. The courts generally claim this power in two areas.
First, since 1943 the Court has asserted a "supervisory authority over the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the federal courts."'198 Since declaring this
power, the Court has "announced general rules of procedure and evidence for
federal criminal proceedings" in numerous cases. 199 A similar assertion of
power in civil cases is rare. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 200 is the most fre-
quently cited example. The Court justifies its exercise of supervisory power in
these cases with its concern for the integrity of the federal courts' processes and
its reluctance to condone inequitable executive practices. 201
Congress occasionally responds to these decisions announcing procedural
rules with legislation.202 Moreover, the Court has upheld congressional rever-
sal of its supervisory opinions, explaining that the judiciary's power to issue
rules of general procedure "exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of
Congress. '20 3
to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts" (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938))).
197. See JACK B. WENSTE=N, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 92 (1977) ("The
traditional vision of tripartite government, at least as formulated by the framers of the Constitution,
reveals Congress as the source of policy-making power.").
198. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (discussing the admissibility of evidence
in a federal murder trial). The Court argued that "[ludicial supervision of the administration of crimi-
nal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence" and therefore excluded the defendant's confession because it resulted from
illegal coercion. Id. at 340.
199. Beale, supra note 183, at 1449; see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190-
92 (1981) (exercising supervisory power to regulate voir dire); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 177-
80 (1975) (using supervisory powers to regulate witness impeachment); Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 190-96 (1946) (prohibiting the discriminatory exclusion of women from jury service in federal
criminal trials).
200. 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (holding that federal juries should be chosen from a cross-section of the
community). In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 n.9 (1972), a plurality of the Court described Thiel as
a supervisory power case.
201. Justice Brandeis first articulated this view in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Court later adopted this view in McNabb, 318 U.S at 347.
202. For instance, Congress rejected the holding in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69
(1957) (requiring the government to comply with orders to produce any statements of government wit-
nesses to be used at trial). Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1988)). Congress also nullified the decision in McNabb through the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1988)).
203. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959); see also Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S.
140, 148 (1985) ("Even a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts
with constitutional or statutory provisions. A contrary result 'would confer on the judiciary discretion-
ary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.'" (quoting
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980))).
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The Court has advanced, primarily in contempt and disciplinary cases, an
Article rI-based vision of inherent authority that responds to separation of
powers concerns and offers a second source of rulemaking authority.2°4 These
cases suggest that the federal courts have inherent power to the extent neces-
sary to exercise their adjudicative function. For instance, the power to sanction
contempt is "inherent in all courts" because "its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judg-
ments. '205 To avoid reliance on the other branches in vindicating their author-
ity, courts claim the inherent power to appoint an attorney to prosecute
contempt,206 to sanction bad faith conduct,207 or even to suspend attorneys
from practice before the court.208 The Supreme Court has nonetheless held
since its earliest cases that Congress can regulate the contempt power, so long
as it does not render it inoperative.209
The Court has deferred to Congress' assessment of the inherent authority
204. In a recent dissent, Justice Scalia explicitly identified Article III as the constitutional source
of the Court's power to protect "the integrity of its proceedings." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 58 (1991) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
205. Ex Pane Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). A half-century later, the Court
elaborated:
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided
and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice. The courts
of the United States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject,
at once become possessed of the power.
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); see also
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911) (explaining that "the power of courts
to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is
absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law").
206. The Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), argued
that the courts' "long settled" authority to begin contempt proceedings necessitates the authority to
appoint private counsel. Thus, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b)'s "assumption that private
attorneys may be used to prosecute contempt actions reflects the longstanding acknowledgement that the
initiation of contempt proceedings to punish disobedience to court orders is part of the judicial func-
tion." Id. at 793-95. The Court further described its inherent authority as "essential to ensuring that the
Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches."
Id. at 796.
207. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46-51 (holding that a district court could invoke its inherent
power to sanction bad faith conduct by assessing attorneys' fees); cf Link v. Wabash Ry., 370 U.S. 626,
629-33 (1962) (discussing federal trial courts' inherent power to dismiss a plaintiff's action sua sponte
for failure to prosecute).
208. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634,643 (1985) (explaining that the inherent authority to suspend
lawyers derives from the lawyer's role as an officer of the court); Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529,
530 (1824) (noting the inherent power to control admission to the bar and to discipline attorneys).
209. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,33 (1812) (construing the implied power
to punish for contempt narrowly, so that any further reach needs congressional authorization). Rejecting
a challenge to congressional power to require a trial by jury in Clayton Act contempt cases, the Supreme
Court stated:
So far as the inferior federal courts are concerned, however, it is not beyond the authority of
Congress to regulate [the contempt power]; but the attributes which inhere in that power and
are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative. That it
may be regulated within limits not precisely defined may not be doubted.
Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66 (1924) (citations omitted); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis,
Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in
Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 1022 (1924) (explaining that "[a]s an incident to their
being, courts must have the authority 'necessary in a strict sense' to enable them to go on with their
work" (quoting Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 280-81 (1923) (Holmes, J.))).
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and supervisory powers, generally accepting its regulation of subjects or rules
announced in inherent authority cases. This deference is in keeping with the
strongest view of the Court's power to make procedural rules, which grounds
the power in Article III. This argument suggests that the power is ancillary,
analogous to the ancillary powers of the President under Article II.210 Thus the
Court's implied rulemaking authority, although generally recognized, should be
subservient to Congress' except where the Court exercises its power in defense
of judicial authority or integrity.211 By and large, this is how the Court has
treated it.212
However, acceptance of neither the Court's nor Congress' strongest state-
ments about Congress' rulemaking authority2 13 is necessary to recognize the
CJRA as constitutionally benign. Even if we assume-as do most commenta-
tors2 14-that the power to enact procedural rules is best shared between the
Congress and the judiciary, the CJRA leaves ultimate control over its imple-
mentation to the judiciary, with few exceptions. 215 While the Act requires each
210. See Beale, supra note 183, at 1470-73 (elaborating on this analogy).
211. Professor Beale takes a contrasting view, allocating Congress more power
A generous interpretation of the courts' ancillary authority under article III is fully con-
sistent wth the Court's recognition that Congress may establish comprehensive rules of proce-
dure and may alter judicially fashioned procedural rules. The necessary and proper clause
expressly empowers Congress to legislate to give effect to the powers of the other branches. If
the implied ancillary authority of the executive and the judiciary under articles If and III is
given a generous interpretation, it will overlap with the legislative authority under the neces-
sary and proper clause. This does not pose a substantial problem, however. In the case of a
conflict, the text of the necessary and proper clause reflects the expectation that Congress
would enact laws to govern the other branches of government.
Id. at 1472 (footnotes omitted).
212. But see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821) (holding that Congress'
inherent power to try contempts committed in its presence was only "the least possible power adequate
to the ends proposed"). Professor Van Alstyne has commented that in ancillary powers cases,
the judiciary has ordinarily been awkward and uncomfortable in passing upon executive (and
judicial) claims of ancillary authority unsupported by Acts of Congress. It has been rightly
"awkward," not because such claims cannot affect the President's business or the judiciary's
business, for clearly they can, but rather because the elements of judgment and compromise
entailed in those claims are the very essence of political judgment-the natural preserve of
legislative determination.
William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of
the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause," 36 OHIo ST. LJ.
788, 805 (1975). Thus, Professor Mullenix's claim that "[p]rocedural rulemaking is an inherent power
of the courts," is much too broad a statement of the nature of this inherent authority. Mullenix, Uncon-
stitutional Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 1297.
213. Professor Mullenix focuses on the Senate Report's response to the separation of powers
arguments federal judges advanced in the CJRA hearings. The Senate Report argued that Congress'
rulemaking authority was superior to the judiciary's. See Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 8,
at 428-32 (citing S. REP. No. 416, supra note 128, at 9-10); Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking,
supra note 8, at 1289 (same).
214. See, e.g., WEINsTEiN, supra note 197, at 77 (pointing out that "[t]here have been serious
suggestions, however, that the legislature can have no role in rule-making. Generally this claim has
been ignored by those charged with the practical task of running govemment."); A. Leo Levin &
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. RE. 1, 42 (1958) (arguing that the balance of powers is designed to allow
courts to "maintain an effective, flexible and thorough-going control over their... procedure, with the
possibility of ultimate legislative review in cases where important decisions of public policy are neces-
sarily involved").
215. Ten federal districts are designated as "pilot" districts and are required to implement six of
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district court to implement a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan
"after consideration of the recommendations of an advisory group," it does not
require that the district courts adopt any of the advisory groups' recommenda-
tions.216  In fact, many courts rejected some of the offered
recommendations. 2 17
The Act also mandates that a committee comprised of the chief judges of
each district court in the circuit, the chief judge of the circuit's court of appeals,
and the Judicial Conference of the United States review the plans.218 While
Congress asked for periodic reports from the Judicial Conference and the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts,219 it has not retained any direct
control over the plans' content. Professor Mullenix's concern that "Congress
has taken procedural rulemaking power away from judges and their expert ad-
visors and delegated it to local lawyers" 220 therefore overstates the CJRA's
impact.
Moreover, the CJRA's provisions do not impair judicial authority. The Act
neither strips the judiciary of its power to decide cases nor sets up serious
impediments to the adjudication of cases.221 For the most part, CJRA provi-
the management techniques outlined in the CJRA. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992) (reproducing
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5097 (1990)). Five districts are named as "demonstra-
tion" districts, required by the act to experiment with various case-management techniques. Id. (repro-
ducing Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 104, 104 Stat. at 5097). The Judicial Conference has the responsibility to
choose the demonstration districts based on its assessment. See notes 32 & 50 supra; text accompanying
note 103 supra.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 472(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
217. Compare INDIANA PLAN, supra note 150, at 60-70 (recommending adoption of nonmanda-
tory alternative dispute resolution measures) with JuDicLAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 76
(noting that the court rejected this recommendation).
218. 28 U.S.C. § 474(a)-(b) (Supp. IV 1992). Professor Tobias notes that the Judicial Conference
delegated its oversight functions to a Committee on Court Administration and Case Management; the
resulting review was not particularly stringent. Tobias, supra note 40, at 1409-11. Professor Tobias
argues that institutional constraints make serious oversight of the local plans unlikely. Il at 1407-08.
219. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. IV 1992).
220. Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 8, at 379; see also Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 1319 (characterizing the CJRA as a "wholesale withdrawal from the courts
of control over their own internal procedure").
221. Professor Mullenix misplaces her reliance on Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the CJRA. Mullenix, Unconsti-
tutional Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 1307. Northern Pipeline is one of four recent Supreme Court
cases involving conflicts between the legislative and judicial branches. See Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 374-79 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 683-84 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of independent
counsel); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1978) (upholding agency
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims). Of the four, the Court found congressional infringement
on the separation of powers only in Northern Pipeline. From this Mullenix concludes that if a CJRA
provision violates the doctrine, "it will be to the extent this legislation suffers constitutional defects as
severe as the.., provisions invalidated in Northern Pipeline. " Id. at 1307.
An examination of Northern Pipeline reveals its tangential and tenuous relationship to the issues in
the CJRA. Northern Pipeline involved a challenge to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which invested non-
Article III bankruptcy judges with
all of the "powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty," except that they "may not enjoin
another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the
court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment." In addition to this broad grant of power,
Congress has allowed bankruptcy judges the power to hold jury trials; to issue declaratory
judgments; to issue writs of habeas corpus under certain circumstances; to issue all writs
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sions simply suggest that case-management practices need both scrutiny and
enhancement. The legislation implements Congress' judgment that the
problems of cost and delay in the federal courts require comprehensive atten-
tion. It is not beyond congressional power to diagnose a problem of national
scope which affects access to justice and then to contemplate measures to ad-
dress that problem. Congress' view is probably empirically flawed, and its
execution less than elegant.222 But the Constitution does not place the subject
of this legislation beyond the scope of Congress' power.
B. Does the CJRA Violate Statutory Limits on Congressional Rulemaking?
As previously discussed, the Rules Enabling Act divides the responsibility
for promulgating rules between the courts and Congress. The REA, however,
leaves Congress the ultimate responsibility to approve civil procedural rules:
The Court must submit proposed rules of general application to Congress and
give that body sufficient time-seven months-to consider them and to disap-
prove them if it wishes.223
Nevertheless, Professor Mullenix argues that the CJRA violates this statu-
tory division of responsibility by arrogating to Congress the power to make
purely procedural rules.224 But it is unusual to speak of Congress as bound by
the terms of previous legislation, unless the legislative division of authority is
necessary in aid of the bankruptcy court's expanded jurisdiction; and to issue any order, pro-
cess, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bank-
ruptcy Act].
458 U.S. at 55 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. IV 1980)) (citations omitted).
The legislation violated basic Article In principles, which, the Court noted, command that "[tihe
judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Art.
Ill." Id. at 58-59. The Act assigned bankruptcy judges most of the jurisdiction of an Article Ill judge,
while withholding the Article III protections of life tenure and protected compensation. Id. at 60.
In Northern Pipeline, the Act's supporters argued that since Article I empowered Congress to
create legislative courts, it could have thus "constituted" the bankruptcy courts as their equivalents. Id.
at 63. The Court, however, rejected this assertion. It viewed situations allowing Article I creation of
legislative courts as "exceptional" and grounded in constitutional text or in historical consensus. Id. at
68-70.
At a minimum, then, a challenge to the CJRA that relies on Northern Pipeline must assert that the
legislation delegates Article II "judicial power" to a body constituted without Article III protections.
The Court has never considered rulemaking authority per se to be an attribute of the judicial power
under Article III. See text accompanying notes 177-180 supra. Even if it were, the assertion that local
advisory groups have been "delegated" that power is unconvincing, since the judiciary controls the
content of the plans. Much of Professor Mullenix's argument hinges on accepting her debatable charac-
terization of procedural rulemaking as a core Article IlI function on a par with adjudication, and of the
advisory groups as being "vested" with that authority. See Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking,
supra note 8, at 1313-14.
222. See Robel, supra note 12, at 117-31.
223. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
224. Discussing the Senate's claim that it had exclusive rulemaking authority, for instance, Profes-
sor Mullenix remarks that
the Senate's argument is flawed because it establishes a principle of rulemaking allocation
without reference to rulemaking content. Thus, the Senate's position fails to recognize that the
Rules Enabling Act has clearly assigned substantive rulemaking power to Congress and proce-
dural rulemaking power to the federal courts. In essence, then, the Rules Enabling Act gov-
erns and limits congressional rulemaking power.
Mullenix, Counter-Reformation, supra note 8, at 427 (citing S. REP. No. 416, supra note 64, at 10).
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constitutionally required. I have argued it is not.225 A delegation need not,
therefore, impair the ability of the delegator to exercise concurrently the power
it has delegated. 22 6
V. A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON LOCAL PROCEDURE
Many courts have erroneously viewed the Civil Justice Reform Act as a
charter for local court procedural independence. However, I began this article
by noting that localism has always been the rebellious stepchild of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.227 For example, as of 1988 there were approximately
5000 local rules promulgated under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 83, so many that a Judicial Conference Committee proposed an amend-
ment to Rule 83 to authorize controlled experimentation with inconsistent local
rules.228
Commentators widely agree that national uniformity in federal procedural
rules is a good idea. Uniformity reduces costs and-although this is less em-
pirically verifiable-increases professionalism. It also improves access to fed-
eral courts by allowing attorneys to master a single body of procedural law.
Finally, uniformity reduces surprise and works toward the goal of deciding
cases on the merits. Why, then, is the impulse for local variation so persistent?
What accounts for the strength of the urge to view the CJRA as a font of local
procedural authority? Does the strength of this urge indicate that Congress
should consider granting courts this power in reality?
There are both laudable and lamentable motivations for local variation, but
the former rarely result in procedural rules. The spectrum of local conditions,
ranging from congested and overworked urban courts to the relative quiet of
225. Were the power to control case-management practices essential to the judicial power, then
the CJRA might be open to challenge under Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In Myers, the
Court struck down a statute that required senatorial approval of an inferior executive officer's removal,
finding the power to remove such officers at will necessary to the power of appointment. Id. at 121-22.
More recent Court precedent questions the utility of identifying "core functions." Morrison, 487 U.S. at
688-90 (limiting the application of Myers).
226. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897) (upholding a congressional grant of concur-
rent power that enables both the District of Columbia and Congress to punish contempt of Congress).
227. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
228. PROPOSED AMNEDMEMrs, supra note 9, at 152-53. The proposed amendment would have
authorized district courts to adopt an "experimental local rule inconsistent with [the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] if it [was] consistent with the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code and
[was] limited in its period of effectiveness to five years or less." Id. at 153. Some commentators have
also recommended experimentation with inconsistent local rules. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 9, at 1584-
85 (arguing in favor of a provision similar to Proposed Rule 83). Other commentators have strongly
opposed this position. See e.g., Roberts, supra note 96, at 537, 549-55.
Unfortunately, the CJRA appears to have discouraged the Standing Committee on Civil Rules from
pursuing a proposed amendment to Rule 83 that would have allowed controlled experimentation with
local procedures. If we can learn anything from recent experience, it is that these local impulses need
desperately to be informed by an accountability to national norms; and the proposed amendment insists
on accountability both by limiting the duration of any local rule inconsistent with national rules, and by
requiring Judicial Council approval for such experimentation. However, the proposed rule is itself in-
consistent with the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act prohibiting local rules that are inconsis-
tent with Federal Rules or other federal legislation. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(f) (1988). If we are to engage in
local procedural experimentation, then, Congress will have to amend the REA to make it possible.
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rural courts, offers the most defensible reason for local variation. Variation in
local conditions, however, has little to do with the concerns that result in proce-
dural rulemaking. Rather, it is the stuff of docket management-how to move
cases smoothly from filing to disposition, to schedule trials, and to monitor
service under chaotic or calm conditions.
Another defensible reason for local rulemaking lies in the persistence of
local legal cultural norms229 governing such practices as the speed with which
a case proceeds to trial or how aggressively discovery is conducted. Indeed, it
may be that our national obsession with discovery control ought to focus pri-
marily on the relatively few jurisdictions where discovery abuse has proved a
problem.230
But it is difficult to argue that the needs of litigants and attorneys within an
individual case vary substantially from Georgia to New York, that Georgia liti-
gants need only a third of the discovery devices New York litigants do, or that
attorneys in Kansas somehow demand a different summary judgment sys-
tem. 231 Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is rarely inspired by the
disutility of a Rule under local conditions. Rather, it is inspired by a belief that
the rulemakers got it wrong.232 This position should be viewed with suspicion,
both because there is a method of securing rule changes that respects national
concerns and because deviations from that method are notoriously difficult to
challenge.233
Moreover, without disparaging the work of the attorneys who sit on advi-
sory groups, it should be noted that there are incentives for local attorneys to
enact local procedures: Local procedures typically favor local bars.234
229. Cf THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., Jo-LYNNE Q. LEE, TERESA TAN, ALAN CARLSON & VIRGINIA
MCCONNELL, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PRETRIAL DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBuOGRAPHY
46-48 (1978) (referring to the notion of a "local discretionary system").
230. Our endless tinkering with discovery and sanctions rules, the most recent examples of which
are illustrated by the December 1993 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 11, might
actually be attempts to use national rules to solve problems that vary strongly by locality.
231. See Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a
local procedure used by the Middle District of Georgia that effectively precluded parties from filing
summary judgment motions).
232. Judge Keeton notes, "[A]s a trial judge myself perhaps I will be forgiven for stating the
point bluntly-nationally uniform rules protect... against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades
among us trial judges." Robert Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853, 860 (1989).
233. Challenging local rules presents difficulties on two fronts. First, the standard against which
such rules are judged-consistency with national rules-is itself difficult to apply. See Levin, supra
note 9, at 1573-76 (tracing the roots and inconsistencies of this ambiguous standard); Roberts, supra
note 96, at 539 & n.8 (tracking the application of the standard in the case law). Second, the litigants are
unlikely to challenge local rules with the mechanisms presently available. See Levin, supra note 9, at
1576 (arguing that the traditional mechanisms are "inadequate"); Roberts, supra note 96, at 546-47, 553
("The impact of the rules on individual litigants is usually too glancing to warrant appeal, and so they
remain unchallenged.").
234. Even if we are convinced that local regulation of certain procedural matters is defensible, we
should still be concerned about the identity of the proceduremakers. We have not really had to face this
issue under the regime of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 and the 1988 amendments to the REA,
both of which require fidelity to national rules. We will certainly have to face questions of this nature in
the world of new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which allows local variation. See FED. R. Crv. P.
26 passim.
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If we are to learn anything from recent experience under the CJRA and the
Local Rules Project, it is the strength of the urge to institute an improved, local
way of doing things. Before we abandon our longstanding commitment to a
uniform national procedure, however, we need to better understand the situa-
tions in which local procedures are more desirable than national ones-and we
need to take a more cautious approach to local decisionmaking than the Civil
Justice Reform Act offers.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it moved through Congress, the CJRA generated an enormous amount of
controversy and ill will between the judiciary and the Act's Senate sponsor. In
retrospect, the process would have been less fractious if the federal judiciary
had been more intimately involved in the legislation's conception. Disliking
the Act Congress gave them, some federal districts have extended the legisla-
tion in ways likely to destroy important procedural values. I hope this article
helps focus the debate on the Act's terms, rather than on the interbranch dis-
agreements about the wisdom or constitutionality of the legislation. Careful
analysis of the CJRA teaches that the congressional mandate to reform civil
justice does not require ignoring values that have served federal procedure well.
Courts should remain sensitive to the costs they impose by straying from na-
tional norms. While the Civil Justice Reform Act makes differences in case-
management practices among districts inevitable, it does not authorize, nor
should it result in, the abandonment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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